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COPYRIGHT’S COMMUNICATIONS POLICY 
Timothy Wu* 
INTRODUCTION 
There is something for everyone to dislike about early twenty-first 
century copyright. Owners of content say that newer and better 
technologies have made it too easy to be a pirate. Easy copying, they 
say, threatens the basic incentive to create new works; new rights and 
remedies are needed to restore the balance. Academic critics instead 
complain that a growing copyright gives content owners dangerous 
levels of control over expressive works. In one version of this 
argument, this growth threatens the creativity and progress that 
copyright is supposed to foster; in another, it represents an “enclosure 
movement” that threatens basic freedoms of expression.1 Copyright, 
these critics argue, has wandered beyond its proper boundaries. They 
also contend that the balance must be restored. 
What all these arguments have in common is a focus on copyright’s 
“authorship” function. Copyright policy, in this view, is fundamentally 
about providing a balance of incentives for authors to effectuate one 
of several possible goals, such as progress of science, democratic 
governance, or the system of free expression. Few disagree that these 
are the goals; the main disagreement is over what means best serve 
these ends. 
Yet the recent history of copyright forces us to ask whether this 
debate can capture what is right and wrong with the law. Both sides 
 
*  Associate Professor of Law, University of Virginia. B.Sc. 1995, McGill University, J.D. 
1998, Harvard. I am grateful for help and comments from Julie Cohen, Becky Eisenberg, 
Jane Ginsburg, Scott Hemphill, Molly Shaffer Van Houweling, Lee Kovarsky, Douglas 
Lichtman, Clarisa Long, David Nimmer, Peter Menell, Robert Merges, Richard Posner, 
Glen Robinson, Lawrence Lessig, Tom Nachbar, Peggy Radin, and Phil Weiser. Excellent 
research assistance was provided by Jeremy Thompson and Lee Kovarksy. Finally, I am 
grateful for feedback from the participants in workshops at Columbia Law School, Stanford 
Law School, University of Michigan Law School, Boalt Hall, Harvard Law Berkman Center, 
the 2003 Telecommunications Policy and Research Conference, the American Law & 
Economics Associations Conference. I owe special consideration to the Birdwood Faculty 
retreat at the University of Virginia Law School. 
1. An exemplar of the latter view is Yohai Benkler, Free as the Air to Common Use: 
First Amendment Constraints on Enclosure of the Public Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 354, 
358 (1999) (arguing that legal rules “enclosing” information risk the diversity of information 
sources and threaten freedom of speech); the former view, LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE 
FUTURE OF IDEAS 85-97 (2001) (endorsing an “information commons” from which authors 
may draw for creative inputs). 
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point to the same problem: a tragedy of authorship caused by their 
opponents. Critics of copyright say that aggressive over-enforcement 
deters those who would borrow from others to create, such as music 
samplers, satirists, and filmmakers. Copyright’s backers warn, 
conversely, that piracy threatens the very livelihood of the artist and 
creative industries. The story of twin tragedies, however, creates an 
indeterminate debate. Both positions have difficulty demonstrating 
empirically, as opposed to anecdotally, that either overprotection or 
piracy has stilled the engines of creativity. Any putative change in 
copyright protection can both be defended as a necessary creative 
incentive and attacked as an unnecessary control. 
This Article suggests that the main challenges for twenty first 
century copyright are not challenges of authorship policy, but rather 
new and harder problems for copyright’s communications policy: 
copyright’s poorly understood role in regulating competition among 
rival disseminators. Since its inception, copyright has set important 
baselines upon which publishers and their modern equivalents do 
business. As the pace of technological change accelerates, copyright’s 
role in setting the conditions for competition is quickly becoming 
more important, even challenging for primacy the significance of 
copyright’s encouragement of authorship. 
None of this is to say that the debate over authorship is a sham, or 
that copyright’s role in incentivizing authorship is unimportant. The 
law, I suggest, can be usefully understood in a modular fashion: as 
comprised of both authorship and communication regimes with often 
independent functions. The first regime is the familiar system, run by 
the courts, that grants exclusive rights to encourage creativity. The 
second is a messier regulatory regime comprised mainly of the sections 
of copyright that have always perplexed copyright theorists and have 
never fit the central theme of author-incentives. This de facto 
communications regime runs through the legislative process and the 
courts, and largely takes the form of industry specific liability rules, 
court created immunities, and special accommodations. 
The study of copyright’s communications policy has both a 
descriptive and a normative payoff. First, it helps us understand both 
the existing copyright code and the history of twentieth century 
copyright. Much of the existing copyright code is difficult to describe 
as a device for providing incentives to create new works. That 
description may fit various “core” doctrines that consume the bulk of 
scholarly attention, such as the idea/expression dichotomy, term limits, 
and parts of the fair use doctrine.2 But the copyright code is also full of 
complex compulsory licensing schemes and technologically specific 
 
2. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 102, 107, 302-04 (2000). 
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immunities.3 The link to authorship in such sections is unclear at best. 
I suggest it will be useful to understand these apparent anomalies as 
part of copyright’s regulation of competing disseminators. 
The observation is confirmed by copyright in the twentieth 
century, where the law has played a recurring role in competition 
between incumbent and challenger disseminators. What follows 
characterizes the copyright’s communications policy into two modes 
(“classic” and “new”) corresponding to two time periods. In the first, 
from 1900-1976, the copyright’s classic communications regime 
evolved through a series of long and extensive conflicts between 
competitive rivals, such as cable and broadcast, radio and song-writers, 
and the early recording players and sheet music publishers. This era is 
characterized by judicial reluctance, even in the face of precedent, to 
extend to incumbents rights of copyright that might be used for 
market advantage over a technologically advanced rival. The statutory 
result were the series of government mandated access schemes, known 
to copyright lawyers as “compulsory licenses,” that make up the bulk 
of the copyright code and are otherwise difficult to characterize. 
The second period, from the 1976 Act onward, has witnessed the 
emergence of a “new” communications policy. New sections of the law 
regulating competition among disseminators have emerged as a 
response to a transformation in the nature of the challenge to 
incumbents. Faced with an alliance between passive but enabling 
technologists and non-commercial but infringing users, copyright 
owners have convinced Congress to enact two new streams of 
copyright law. The first is a set of rules for managing the relationship 
between technologists — largely, the electronics and internet 
industries — and traditional disseminating industries, typically in the 
form of judicial or legislative safeharbors. The second stream is a 
series of “anti-piracy” rules that seek to put direct controls on user 
behavior. 
The study of copyright’s role in regulating competition, I suggest, 
reveals a copyright that theorists may hardly recognize. It is not that 
scholars are unaware of copyright’s role in communications policy — 
the importance of “dissemination” has always been recognized as a 
goal of copyright.4 The point, rather, is that the author-centrism of 
copyright theory has left little basis to evaluate or criticize copyright’s 
decisions that create communications policy. 
There is, finally, a normative payoff from the study of copyright’s 
role in communications regulation. In the last several decades, the 
 
3. These sections are described in depth in Part I.C, infra. 
4. See, e.g., Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975) (“[The 
copyright holder’s] private motivation must ultimately serve the cause of promoting broad 
public availability of literature, music, and the other arts.”). 
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United States has generally endorsed a model of open, competitive 
innovation as its national communications policy. It is, in other words, 
a point of agreement that neither government nor industry 
monopolists are well situated to choose what technologies or firms the 
nation should use to communicate, now or in the future. Copyright, as 
it grows in importance, should not be exempt from such principles. 
Few would disagree that the basic vision of competitive innovation is 
an attractive vision. Although many may disagree on how the goal 
might best be achieved, it cannot be reached without an awareness of 
the role that copyright plays in setting national communications 
policy. That requires that judges and policymakers further develop an 
appreciation of copyright’s effects on parties other than authors. 
The Article is divided into three parts. The first describes 
American copyright’s “classic” communications policy. After situating 
the communications perspective in traditional copyright theory, it 
explains where the legal expression of copyright’s communications 
regime can be found, and details its evolution during the period of 
1900-1976. The second part is primarily theoretical. It provides tools, 
taken from telecommunications and competition theory, for 
understanding and analyzing the communications policies that 
copyright has implemented. The third part describes copyright’s 
“new” communications policy, which has evolved post-1976. It closes 
on a normative note, suggesting how courts and lawmakers can decide 
copyright issues with an eye to their effects for competition and 
national communications policy. 
I. A DESCRIPTIVE MODEL OF COPYRIGHT 
A. Author-Centrism 
Copyright theory is traditionally depicted as a long conflict 
between two dueling theories. In accounts now very familiar to 
copyright theorists, the first of these warring theories is Anglo-
American and describes the purposes of copyright as “utilitarian” or 
“economic.”5 It premises the existence of copyright on market failure.6 
Copyright exists to provide incentives for authors to produce works 
and thereby avoid the underproduction that might otherwise result.7 
Under this theory copyright law is ultimately similar to other forms of 
 
5. See, e.g., William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of 
Copyright Law, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 325, 326 (1989) (“Striking the correct balance between 
access and incentives is the central problem in copyright law. For copyright law to promote 
economic efficiency, its principal legal doctrines must, at least approximately, maximize the 
benefits from creating additional works minus both the losses from limiting access and the 
costs of administering copyright protection.”). 
6. See id. at 333-34. 
7. See id. at 327-28. 
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economic legislation; it is Lord Macaulay’s “tax on readers for the 
purpose of giving a bounty to writers.”8 
The rival to the Anglo-American view resides mainly on the 
Continent and is known in the United States as the natural rights 
theory of copyright. It suggests that authors have a moral right to the 
fruits of their labors: copyright is granted because the author deserves 
it.9 One version of this idea says that authors should be rewarded for 
the value they contribute to society.10 Another suggests a natural link 
between creation and ownership: the author owns his (smaller) 
creation in just the manner that God owns his (slightly larger) 
creation. What you create is yours: “‘to every cow her calf.’”11 
Today this traditional debate has taken on a modern gloss. Natural 
rights theories, in the United States at least, have retreated to the 
status of foil, used more to accuse than to defend.12 The dominant 
starting point for most American scholarship is an incentives theory, 
or the “incentive/access” paradigm, which is the idea that copyright 
expresses some balance between encouraging creation of expressive 
works, while providing for adequate access to the work for new 
authors and others. As Mark Lemley expresses the conventional 
wisdom, “both the United States Constitution and judicial decisions 
seem to acknowledge the primacy of incentive theory in justifying 
intellectual property.”13 
Taking incentive theory as a baseline, writers have moved in two 
major directions, emphasizing the private and public benefits of 
 
8. Thomas Babington Macaulay, Speech Delivered to British House of Commons 
Regarding 1841 Copyright Bill (Feb. 5, 1841), in MACAULAY’S SPEECHES ON COPYRIGHT 
AND LINCOLN’S ADDRESS AT COOPER UNION 25 (Charles Robert Gaston ed., 1914). 
9. See Alfred C. Yen, Restoring the Natural Law: Copyright as Labor and Possession, 51 
OHIO ST. L.J. 517, 522-24 nn.27-44 (1990) (detailing the evolution of natural rights theory 
through Roman and English Law). For an example of a contemporary natural rights theory, 
see Wendy J. Gordon, A Property Right in Self-Expression: Equality and Individualism in the 
Natural Law of Intellectual Property, 102 YALE L.J. 1533, 1535 (1993) (arguing that a return 
to natural rights theory would protect free speech interests). 
10. See MARSHALL LEAFFER, UNDERSTANDING COPYRIGHT LAW 58 (3d ed. 1999). 
11. AUGUSTINE BIRRELL, SEVEN LECTURES ON THE LAW AND HISTORY OF 
COPYRIGHT IN BOOKS 42 (1899). 
12. Much recent writing on natural rights theories of copyright seeks not to defend it, 
but rather to accuse Congress or the courts of wrongly reinstituting a natural rights regime 
through expansion of copyright. See, e.g., JAMES BOYLE, SHAMANS, SOFTWARE, AND 
SPLEENS: LAW AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE INFORMATION SOCIETY 56-59 (1996); 
MARK ROSE, AUTHORS AND OWNERS: THE INVENTION OF COPYRIGHT 125-28 (1993); 
Gordon, supra note 9, at 1540 (arguing that courts have mistakenly interpreted the natural 
law theory of copyright and afforded too much protection to authors at the expense of free 
speech interests); Peter Jaszi, Toward a Theory of Copyright: The Metamorphoses of 
“Authorship”, 1991 DUKE L.J. 455, 471-90; see also Yen, supra note 9, at 529-39 (stressing 
that natural law concepts are inherent in copyright law). 
13. Mark A. Lemley, The Economics Of Improvement In Intellectual Property Law, 75 
TEX. L. REV. 989, 993 (1997). 
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copyright, respectively. A group of economic theorists have 
supplemented basic incentives theories with work stressing the static 
benefits of copyright as a form of property, relying generally on the 
utility of assigning property rights to owners.14 The second cluster of 
theories stresses public rationales other than market failure for 
encouraging authorship. Enjoying great academic, if not judicial, 
popularity are theories that conceive of copyright’s incentive system as 
part of the larger system of free expression associated with the First 
Amendment.15 Another group treats copyright’s incentive structure as 
playing a role in promoting a republican system of governance.16 
This story is familiar and greatly interesting to copyright theorists, 
but can be misleading. The access/incentives paradigm and the 
theories that follow it are principally theories that center on the author 
and the creation or ownership of expressive works. They have much 
less to say about disseminators and the economics of distribution. 
They are, in short, author-centric theories of copyright. And although 
theories of authorship are a crucial part of copyright theory, they 
provide only a partial description of the law. 
This basic contention is supported by a casual read of the copyright 
code. Large portions of the statute are difficult to describe as parts of 
a property scheme balanced to encourage the creation of new works. 
That description may fit certain core sections such as the 
idea/expression dichotomy in section 102 of title 17, the exclusive 
rights expressed in section 106 and general exceptions such as the fair 
use doctrine, found in section 107. But large parts — indeed the 
greatest volume of actual text — fail to conform to this model. These 
parts are rather devoted to industry specific liability rules (compulsory 
licensing schemes) and immunities — sections that are ugly, 
 
14. See, e.g., WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC 
STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 85-123 (2003) (describing various economic 
roles played by copyrights, mainly related to the reduction of transaction costs); Wendy J. 
Gordon, An Inquiry into the Merits of Copyright: The Challenges of Consistency, Consent, 
and Encouragement Theory, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1343, 1435-49 (1989) (pointing to “authors’ 
entitlements as the starting points from which markets evolve”); Robert P. Merges, Are You 
Making Fun of Me?: Notes on Market Failure and the Parody Defense in Copyright, 21 
AIPLA Q.J. 305, 306 (1993) (stating that economic analysis of copyright has “progressed 
beyond the point where a crude ‘incentive’ story passes for analysis in every case”). 
15. See, e.g., Benkler, supra note 1, at 391-94; Jed Rubenfeld, The Freedom of 
Imagination: Copyright’s Constitutionality, 112 YALE L.J. 4 (2002) (evaluating copyright on a 
theory of free speech centered on the “freedom of imagination”); Rebecca Tushnet, 
Copyright As A Model For Free Speech Law: What Copyright Has In Common With Anti-
Pornography Laws, Campaign Finance Reform, And Telecommunications Regulation, 42 
B.C. L. REV. 1 (2001). Despite the academic attention, arguments calling for greater scrutiny 
of copyright under the First Amendment have been nearly without exception rejected by the 
Supreme Court, most recently in Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 198 (2003) and earlier in 
Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 560 (1985). 
16. See, e.g., William W. Fisher III, Reconstructing the Fair Use Doctrine, 101 HARV. L. 
REV. 1659, 1691 (1988); Netanel, infra note 381, at 347. 
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complicated, and obscure.17 They include the mechanical license in 
section 115, the secondary transmission license (for cable television) in 
section 111, and particular immunities for particular groups, such as 
internet service providers in section 512 and digital audio recording 
devices in sections 1001-1010. Their relationship to a putative author’s 
incentives to create would seem at best indirect; the schemes, on their 
face, seem to have much more to do with managing competition 
between industry rivals. 
Purely author-centric theories also have trouble explaining the 
“secondary” costs of copyright: those imposed on actors other than 
authors and consumers. Incentive theories are interested in two 
categories of copyright’s effects: the benefits that accrue to authors 
and the corresponding costs imposed on consumers and new creators. 
Yet it is evident that much of the costs of copyright are borne by other 
actors. One need only look to those who object to copyright to see 
where costs are felt. The costs of piracy are invariably a complaint of 
incumbent disseminators, whereas new market entrants for their part 
complain about being squashed by incumbents.18 Finally, tele-
communications firms and electronics manufacturers complain about 
the costs they bear when enlisted to enforce copyright schemes of 
contributory liability.19 These secondary costs of copyright, together 
with the large sections of the code described above, are data points 
that classic authorship theories have difficultly explaining. 
The point is not that scholars are unaware of the secondary costs of 
copyright or unacquainted with the difficult sections of the copyright 
code just described. Scholars like Paul Goldstein, Jane Ginsburg and 
Jessica Litman have long portrayed copyright’s history as a struggle to 
adapt to new technologies.20 Meanwhile, numerous copyright scholars 
from the San Francisco Bay Area and other high-tech zones, like 
Pamela Samuelson, Mark Lemley, Julie Cohen, Peter Jaszi and James 
Boyle, have been arguing for the last decade that copyright may 
 
17. These sections enjoy only passing attention in copyright casebooks. See, e.g., 
NIMMER ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON COPYRIGHT 225-28, 556 (6th ed. 2000) 
(including five pages on compulsory licensing in a book of 1230 pages). The difficulty and 
tedium of teaching statutory licenses, however, explains this cursory treatment. 
18. See, e.g., Lee Gomes, In Name of Innovation Some Let Technology Get Away With 
Murder, WALL ST. J., May 5, 2003, at B1 (discussing whether technological innovation 
provides an excuse for piracy); Jack Kapica, Copyright Litigation is Threatening Innovation, 
THE GLOBE AND MAIL, Dec. 11, 2003, at B13 (suggesting that copyright threatens 
innovation). 
19. See, e.g., Mike Musgrove, Copyfight Renewal: Owners of Digital Devices Sue to 
Assert the Right to Record, WASH. POST, June 7, 2002, at E1 (detailing fight between 
electronics firms and Hollywood). 
20. See PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT’S HIGHWAY: FROM GUTENBERG TO THE 
CELESTIAL JUKEBOX (rev. ed., Stanford Univ. Press 2003); Jane Ginsburg, Copyright and 
Control Over New Technologies of Dissemination, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1613, 1622 (2001); 
Jessica Litman, Digital Copyright (2001). 
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threaten technological innovation.21 And closest to the methods of this 
Article, economic-oriented copyright theorists, including Robert 
Merges, Randal Picker, Richard Posner, William Landes and Douglas 
Lichtman are in the midst of an ongoing effort to generate secondary 
economic explanations for aspects of copyright that do not fit the 
central incentives story.22 What follows is both indebted and 
complementary to these efforts to undercover secondary purposes of 
the copyright law. 
What differentiates this Article is its focus on the role and history 
of disseminators, as opposed to authors, under copyright law.  The 
descriptive theory following is also an effort to consolidate many of 
the various insights from the last decade of scholarship into a larger 
theory. Whether called the regulatory or communications theory of 
copyright, it aims to consolidate our understanding of the regulation of 
both disseminators and authors to give a more complete account of 
what copyright is doing and why. If what follows is correct, copyright’s 
role in communications policy is both only partially understood, and 
also likely to have increasing importance as the scope of copyright 
increases. 
B. A Descriptive Theory of Copyright Law 
It is not wrong or inaccurate to say that copyright is a system of 
property rights designed to encourage creation. I argue, however, that 
one can also usefully describe copyright as a system that has evolved 
to manage competition among natural rivals in the world of packaged 
information. To see what this means, consider the world of packaged 
information as comprised primarily of three groups: authors, 
disseminators, and consumers of expressive works. 
 
21. A few representative examples include James Boyle, The Second Enclosure 
Movement and the Construction of the Public Domain, 66 LAW AND CONTEMP. PROBS. 33 
(2003); Julie E. Cohen, Copyright and the Perfect Curve, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1799 (2000); 
Peter Jaszi, Caught in the Net of Copyright, 75 OR. L. REV. 299 (1996); Mark Lemley, The 
Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property Law, 75 TEX. L. REV. 989 (1997); Pamela 
Samuelson, Regulation of Technologies to Protect Copyrighted Works, 39 COMMUNICATIONS 
OF THE ACM (1996). Some have also reversed the question and asked whether copyright 
itself will fall victim to forces of technological change. See, e.g., Eben Moglen, Anarchism 
Triumphant: Free Software and the Death of Copyright, First Monday, August 1999. 
22. Principal examples include LANDES & POSNER, supra note 14, at 17-18; Douglas 
Lichtman, Copyright as a Rule of Evidence, 52 DUKE L.J. 683, 705 (2003) (describing 
sections of copyright as motivated by an evidentiary function); Randal C. Picker, Copyright 
as Entry Policy: The Case of Digital Distribution, 47 ANTITRUST BULL. 423 (2002); Michael 
Abramowicz, Copyright Redundancy 9 (March 2003), at http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=374580 
(describing much of copyright as motivated by an interest in preventing redundancy and rent 
dissipation). 
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FIGURE 1.1: COPYRIGHT RELATIONSHIPS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The thesis is that copyright law emerges as a byproduct of conflict 
between the parties pictured here. All of these parties — incumbent 
and new authors, incumbent and new disseminators, and consumers — 
are in relationships made up of repeat interactions fraught with 
potential for conflict and abusive behavior. Although conflicts may 
arise between any of the pictured parties,23 the law focuses on two 
relationships: those amongst new and existing authors and those 
amongst incumbent and challenger disseminators. The first is familiar: 
it is copyright’s authorship regime. The second is less so: it is 
copyright’s communications regime — so named because it regulates 
the same parties (disseminators) as communications law, and because 
it confronts similar problems. As presented in this paper, moreover, 
the term “communications policy” is taken simply to mean a special 
case of competition, or antitrust policy as between disseminators.24 
 
23. The contest between freelance writers and those who distribute their materials 
online is an example of the relationship between existing authors and new disseminators. 
See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483, 487-88 (2001) (concerning a clash over 
the newspaper’s sale of copyrighted text to be retrievable in a database search). So, to a 
degree, was the conflict between composers and music publishers and the radio broadcast 
industry. See infra notes 109-159 and accompanying text. 
24. For the view that communications policy is an application of antitrust principles in a 
particular context, see, e.g., J. Gregory Sidak, Telecommunications in Jericho, 81 CAL. L. 
REV. 1209, 1237-38 (1993) (book review) (arguing for the consolidation of reasoning in 
communications law and antitrust). The context is distinguished by two factors: first, the 
frequent existence of bottleneck infrastructures, see infra Part II.A, and second, the 
existence of fixed statutory policies that occasionally mandate deviations from the goal of 
maximizing consumer welfare, such as the goals of “universal service” (communications 
technologies should be available to every citizen), see generally Milton Mueller, Universal 
Service in Telephone History: A Reconstruction, 17 TELECOMM. POL’Y 352, 356 (1993), and 
“localism” (support for local media outlets over national), see, e.g., 47 U.S.C.A. § 521(2) 
(2001) (discussing importance of local control over cable). 
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FIGURE 1.2: PROBLEMATIC BEHAVIOR IN THE WORLD OF 
COPYRIGHT 
 
 
What kinds of problems emerge amongst new and existing 
players? Copyright law has evolved to deal with two recurrent types of 
abusive behavior. The first is misappropriation, which arises because 
each “new” actor (whether author or disseminator) has the capability 
to appropriate and free ride off of the investments made by existing 
actors, whether in expressive works, distribution channels, or 
otherwise.25 The mirror image of misappropriation is lock-out 
behavior, which arises from the capability of an existing actor to block 
market entry and exclude or control potential new competitors. The 
 
25. Wendy Gordon describes this as the “restitutionary impulse.” See Wendy J. Gordon, 
On Owning Information: Intellectual Property and the Restitutionary Impulse, 78 VA. L. REV. 
149, 150-51 (1992); see also Richard A. Posner, Misappropriation: A Dirge, 40 HOUS. L. REV. 
621, 621-25 (2003) (arguing that misappropriation “is a candidate to be the overarching 
principle that would rationalize intellectual property law as a whole . . . [but] is too sprawling 
a concept to serve as the organizing principle”). 
D
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various legal schemes engineered to prevent these two private wrongs 
can be understood to comprise much of what we call copyright law. 
Nothing here assumes that the actors pictured will always behave 
in abusive ways. Not every new writer is a plagiarist nor is every 
incumbent industry bent on destroying emerging competitors. But in 
this view copyright has, as Oliver Wendell Holmes suggested 
generally, evolved to meet systematic misbehavior.26 
Copyright’s authorship regime needs little introduction because it 
is already the focus of most scholarly attention. It is only worth noting 
that copyright handles the misappropriation problem among authors 
in very clever ways. Copyright for authors has created a doctrinal 
“floor” and “ceiling,” where the floor is the requirement of originality, 
and the ceiling is the lack of protection for the ideas underlying 
expression.27 Together, and joined by the fair use exception,28 these 
core doctrines create the familiar idea of a balance that allows certain 
but not all forms of appropriation. This is a familiar subject to anyone 
who has studied copyright and needs little repetition. Conversely, 
copyright’s communications regime, which manages similar problems 
among disseminators, is far less studied and understood. The 
remainder of this Part is an effort to remedy that imbalance. 
C. The Communications Regime Revealed 
Copyright’s communications regime, its management of rival 
disseminators, is not a recent phenomenon, for it actually predates 
copyright’s authorship regime. The management of competition 
among publishers, copyright historians tell us, was actually the earliest 
purpose of copyright. Historian Ray Patterson explains, “[H]istory 
shows us [that] copyright began as a publisher’s right, a right which 
functioned in the interest of the publisher, with no concern for the 
author.”29 
 
26. See Mr. Justice Holmes, Address at Boston University School of Law (Jan. 8, 1897), 
in The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 459 (1897). This was also a view of law stated 
by Epicurus: “The laws exist for the sake of the wise, not that they may not do wrong, but 
that they may not suffer it.” Epicurus, The Extant Writings of Epicurus, in THE STOIC AND 
EPICUREAN PHILOSOPHERS 51 (C. Bailey trans., Whitney J. Oates ed., 1940). 
27. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2000). 
28. See Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure, 30 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y 253, 256 
(1983). 
29. LYMAN RAY PATTERSON, COPYRIGHT IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 8 (1968). 
Some, such as Jane Ginsburg, would argue that the word copyright should not be understood 
other than as a right subsisting in an author, and that to speak of a publisher’s or stationer’s 
copyright is a contradiction in terms. I take no position on this issue, but note that some 
historians do use the term copyright in reference to the early rights of publishers. See id. at 
43; see also BENJAMIN KAPLAN, AN UNHURRIED VIEW OF COPYRIGHT 5 (1967) (using the 
term in this manner). 
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According to copyright historians the stationers’ (publishers’) 
rights in the 1500s and 1600s, later codified in the Statute of Anne,30 
allocated among the stationers the exclusive rights to copy a given 
manuscript (the copy rights).31 The original copyrights functioned as a 
device that eliminated direct competition between stationers and were 
generally unconcerned with authorial matters.32 As Joseph 
Loewenstein explains, the earliest ancestors of copyright were “a 
privilege conferred by the guild on one of its members, part of an 
imperfect but not ineffective system by which the guild sought to 
preserve internal order.”33 
Matters have changed less in the last 400 years than one might 
think. Copyright, as in the seventeenth century, is still quite concerned 
with maintaining order among the rival stationers of our era. The only 
difference is that we call the stationers disseminators, and believe 
despite evidence to the contrary that modern copyright is primarily an 
author's right. 
1. Statutory Modules 
The most obvious and important manifestations of copyright’s 
communication regime take up most of title 17 of the United States 
Code. They are the complex statutory management schemes that 
balance the respective rights of dissemination industries. The rules 
embedded in title 17 are modules of communications policy specific to 
a particular industry and, usually, to a specific historical context. Each 
is complicated and lengthy, and collectively make for perhaps the least 
glamorous parts of copyright. 
Most of the modules occupy section 111 to section 122 of title 17 of 
the United States code. Each has much in common, speaking to and 
managing competition between potential communications rivals: 
broadcast and cable, broadcast and satellite, phonograph and Internet, 
and so on. The most common way of achieving a compromise between 
rivals is a “compulsory licensing” scheme: laws that force the copyright 
owner to provide open and non-discriminatory access to a work in 
exchange for a fixed payment. Modern modules, such as the section 
512 scheme for internet service providers, create immunities schemes. 
 
30. Act for the Encouragement of Learning, 1710, 8 Ann., c. 19 (Eng.). 
31. For a discussion of the early history involving the Stationers’ Copyright and the 
Statute of Anne, see L. Ray Patterson & Craig Joyce, Copyright in 1791: An Essay 
Concerning the Founders’ View of the Copyright Power Granted to Congress in Article I, 
Section 8, Clause 8 of the U.S. Constitution, 52 EMORY L.J. 909, 913-28 (2003). 
32. See KAPLAN, supra note 29, at 4 (“[The stationers’ copyrights] did not, however, 
stand on any notion of original composition, for they might be granted for ancient as well as 
new works.”). 
33. JOSEPH E. LOEWENSTEIN, THE AUTHOR’S DUE: PRINTING AND THE PREHISTORY 
OF COPYRIGHT 29 (2002). 
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A summary description of the major modules and their features 
follows: 
a. Secondary transmissions by cable operators and others. This is an 
extremely complex compulsory license scheme enacted in 1976. 
Congress enacted it in response to cable operators’ unpaid usage of 
broadcast signals from the 1950s to the 1970s. It requires 
rebroadcasters — principally, cable operators, but also hotels and 
apartment complexes — to pay a fixed fee for a license to rebroadcast 
copyrighted materials and is found in title 17, section 111 of the U.S. 
Code. 
b. Digital audio transmission/webcasting license. A provision 
requiring Internet “radio stations” to pay a statutory fee in order to 
rebroadcast copyrighted materials is found in section 114. 
c. The “mechanical license.” This compulsory license allows anyone 
wanting to record a composed song to pay a fixed fee to the composer. 
It also allows recording of “cover” versions of famous songs. The 
mechanical license is found in section 115. 
d. Jukebox negotiated licenses. This section mandates negotiation 
for the licenses to play sound recordings of nondramatic musical 
works on jukeboxes and is located in section 116. 
e. Public broadcast license. Section 118 of the Copyright Act 
creates a compulsory license for the use of published nondramatic 
musical works and published pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works in 
connection with noncommercial broadcasting. 
f. Satellite retransmissions of television signals. A compulsory 
license scheme, similar to that found in section 111, applies specifically 
to satellite rebroadcast of content both from broadcasters and from 
cable operators. It is found in section 119. 
g. Satellite retransmissions of television signals into local markets. A 
bargain between the satellite, broadcast, and cable industries, section 
122 grants satellite rebroadcasters a free (no royalty) compulsory 
license for local broadcasting, provided they agree to carry all 
television broadcast stations located within the local market.34 
h. Immunity for ISPs transmitting or hosting infringing material. A 
compromise reached in 1998 between Internet Service Providers 
(“ISPs”) and content owners grants ISPs varying levels of immunity 
for the storage or transmission of copyrighted content. ISPs are 
generally immune from the transmission of infringing content, while 
search engines and those who host content are subject to a duty to 
take or delink infringing material upon notice. These rules are found 
in section 512 of title 17. 
 
34. See Ellen P. Goodman, Bargains in the Information Marketplace: The Use of 
Government Subsidies to Regulate New Media, 1 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. 217 (2002). 
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i. Immunity for producers of digital audio recording devices. 
Section 1008 contains a grant of immunity to manufacturers of digital 
audio recording devices (like “DATs”) on condition of the payment of 
a royalty on each sale. 
The existence and significance of the statutory modules cannot be 
questioned. The cable industry, just to take one example, based its 
early existence on access to copyrighted works, and has paid billions in 
access fees to broadcasters.35 Yet where do these modules come from 
and what purpose do they serve? 
Unlike the familiar judicial process behind most of copyright’s 
authorship decision, the process behind copyright’s communications 
regime is a much murkier subject. The complex statutory modules 
described above are the product of a different and somewhat unusual 
institutional process: a mixed procedure of the federal courts 
(particularly the Supreme Court), and a separate process of mediated 
copyright settlement. The usual but not invariable results are the 
modules that are the active mainstay of copyright’s communications 
regime. 
2. Copyright’s Evolution 
Scholarly depictions of the evolution of copyright in the twentieth-
century generally fall into two schools. The first is optimistic, and 
explicitly or implicitly inspired by the economist Harold Demsetz.36 It 
regards the expansion of copyright as a series of efficiency-promoting 
adjustments made necessary by changes in technology and the 
increased importance of the information economy. Legislatures, in this 
model, have enacted new copyright laws to bring the benefits of 
copyright propertization to new industries. Robert Merges writes, for 
example, that “through a combination of judicial adaptation and 
legislative updates, the copyright system has — so far, at least — been 
up to the job at every turn.”37 
The second school is pessimistic, and depicts the expansion of 
copyright with the aid of classic public choice theory. Inspired by 
Mancur Olsen rather than Demsetz, it sees copyright owners as a 
discrete and highly organized group whose lobbying acumen has led to 
 
35. The cable industry had paid about $2.3 billion as of 1997 for access to broadcast 
signals. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, A REVIEW OF THE COPYRIGHT LICENSING REGIMES 
COVERING RETRANSMISSION OF BROADCAST SIGNALS 20 (1997) (citing testimony of the 
National Cable Television Association). 
36. See, e.g., GOLDSTEIN, supra note 20; Robert Merges, One Hundred Years of 
Solicitude: Intellectual Property Law, 1900-2000, 88 CAL. L. REV. 2187 (2000); see generally 
Saul Levmore, Property’s Uneasy Path and Expanding Future, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 181 (2003). 
37. Merges, supra note 36, at 2191. 
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a century of advantageous legislation.38 Consumers, disorganized and 
disparate, end up as the principal victims. As Jessica Litman wrote in 
1989, “Each time we rely on current stakeholders to agree on a 
statutory scheme, they produce a scheme designed to protect 
themselves against the rest of us.”39 
Most scholars — even those associated with one or another school 
— will admit that copyright’s evolution reflects elements of both 
approaches. What I present here is not a general theory of copyright’s 
evolution, but rather a theory that is primarily designed to explain the 
evolution and origins of copyright’s liability rules. (A more general 
theory of the evolution of liability rules is planned but not found in 
this Article). These, I suggest, can be best understood through a model 
of conflict that sees law emerging as a political reaction to changes in 
relative prices resulting from technological change. This borrows from 
similar simple models of conflict between more and less efficient 
producers recurrent in trade economics. 
3. A Model of Conflict 
The central modules of copyright’s classic communications policy 
have arisen out of conflict — out of bitter, public battles between 
incumbent and challenger disseminators who often seem determined 
to do or say anything to get their way. That, at least, is the repeated 
pattern of the twentieth century and, if the first few years are any 
indication, it will persist as a part of the twenty-first century copyright 
landscape. 
The twentieth century witnessed decades-long battles between, to 
name just a few examples, the recording industry and sheet music 
publishers, cable companies and broadcasters, electronics 
manufacturers and recording companies, and the recording industry 
and online music distributors. But why do these conflicts arise? Are 
they a permanent part of the landscape? 
This Section argues that given only very basic assumptions, public 
conflicts among rival disseminators are nearly inevitable and therefore 
a permanent problem for copyright’s regulation of packaged 
information. We can predict that conflicts between incumbent and 
challenger disseminators will arise so long as two things are true: first, 
that more efficient technologies of dissemination will be invented and 
second, that there exists the possibility, but not the certainty, of 
convincing government to provide laws that can be used against a 
competitor. I suggest, in other words, that the conflicts that arise in the 
 
38. See, e.g., LESSIG, supra note 1; Jessica Litman, Copyright Legislation and 
Technological Change, 68 ORE. L. REV. 275 (1989). 
39. Litman, supra note 38, at 359. 
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copyright world are not much different from those in other areas 
where government might act, if convinced, to protect market 
competitors. For example, the conflicts between classes of 
disseminators are conceptually similar to the conflicts that arise when 
domestic industries face more efficient foreign competitors.40 The 
difference is that the parties invoke or seek new copyright laws, rather 
than tariffs and other trade barriers. 
An incumbent disseminator industry sells expressive works using 
existing technology. The industry’s costs, including payments to 
authors, result in supply curve SI. To simplify, assume that the 
copyright law confers no ability to set a supra-competitive price, so 
that that the price is determined by where supply meets demand, as 
follows:41 
FIGURE 2.1: THE INCUMBENT INDUSTRY ALONE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A challenger industry is any group of entities that enjoy an 
advantage in the efficiency of dissemination (supply curve SC). This 
condition can arise for several reasons. The first reason derives from 
any technological advantage in the delivery of content — either better 
quality (like cable or piano rolls), or lower cost (like broadcasting or 
online distribution).42 Either form of technological advantage can be 
modeled as simply a more efficient supply curve. The second reason 
derives from the challenger’s ability to disseminate content less 
 
40. See Joel R. Paul, Do International Trade Institutions Contribute to Economic Growth 
and Development?, 44 VA. J. INT’L L. 285 (2003) (describing similar model). 
41. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 21.5 (4th ed. 1992) 
(observing that different estimates of the odds of favorable government action make 
settlement of lawsuits less likely). 
42. Some, including Scott Hemphill, suggest it is strange to model increased quality as a 
more efficient supply curve, arguing that a product of increased quality should be modeled 
as a new product with a separate demand curve. To clarify, the suggestion is that a better 
quality TV can be compared to the old TV plus a cash supplement. This I think is a fair 
representation of what is usually the reduced annoyance and greater enjoyment that comes 
from a better quality product. 
Price 
Quantity 
Si 
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expensively because it does not pay for the works itself. That may be 
the case either because existing copyright law does not explicitly apply 
(as was the case with early cable and gramophone technology) or 
because of some capability to evade copyright law’s requirement to 
license the work (as in the example of online distribution). In either 
case, part of the challenger’s advantage in efficiency stems from what 
is usually described as piracy. 
FIGURE 2.2: THE CHALLENGE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
But why does the arrival of a more efficient technological rival 
create conflict? Conflict arises because of my second assumption: that 
government can sometimes be convinced to protect the incumbent 
industry, but not always, and not predictably. If the degree of 
protection is difficult to predict and depends in part on investments in 
persuasion, it makes sense for both the incumbent and the challenger 
to invest in efforts to obtain a favorable outcome. These rival 
investments in obtaining a favorable governmental action result in 
some of the longest running conflicts in copyright history.43 
More precisely, conflict arises in a form that public choice theorists 
call a contest between “rent-protecting” and “rent-seeking” interests. 
This is a contest where an incumbent dedicates resources to protecting 
its favorable position against encroachment by other groups.44 The 
incumbent holds a number of potential legal threats against any 
challenger, including the imposition of incessant litigation costs,45 an 
ability to convince regulators (like the Federal Communications 
 
43. Cf. James M. Buchanan, Rent Seeking and Profit Seeking, in TOWARD A THEORY OF 
THE RENT-SEEKING SOCIETY 3, 9-11 (James M. Buchanan et al. eds., 1980) (explaining that 
the possibility of government action encourages investments in efforts to obtain rents). 
44. For an explication of rent-protecting in the context of public choice theory, see 
Robert D. Tollison, Rent Seeking, in PERSPECTIVES ON PUBLIC CHOICE 506, 515-17 (Dennis 
C. Mueller ed., 1997). 
45. See Tim Wu, When Code Isn’t Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 679, 705 (2003). 
Price 
Quantity 
Si 
SC 
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Commission (FCC)) to restrict the challenger,46 or lobbying for laws 
that will put the challenger at a serious disadvantage.47 
Part II of this Article describes in greater detail how copyright laws 
and other laws can be used as a tool of foreclosure. Here we can set 
forth the incumbent’s potential strategies. There are two: the first is to 
try eliminate the challenge by increasing the challenger’s costs by, for 
example, denying the challenger access to an essential input (the 
copyrighted work). The result is pictured below, where the 
challenger’s supply curve is shifted to the uncompetitive Sc*. This is a 
strategy akin to seeking trade protection through tariff or an import 
ban. The second strategy is to co-opt the challenger: to allow the 
challenger to sell at a price corresponding to its more efficient supply 
curve, but to pay a tax to the incumbent that transfers as much of its 
producer surplus as possible. In either case the incumbent relies on 
government assistance to achieve its desired result. 
FIGURE 2.3: SUCCESSFUL ELIMINATION OF COMPETITION 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The technological challenger, meanwhile, invests its own producer 
surplus (based on its more efficient supply curve) in efforts to prevent 
government from protecting the disseminator or increasing the 
challenger’s costs. Such investments can be as basic as defending 
copyright litigation, but can also include more outlandish measures 
such as using the antitrust law or devising better means of evading 
copyright enforcement (a recent strategy).48 
For all of these strategies, the critical assumption is that the form 
and even the odds of favorable government’s action will be hard to 
predict. Imperfect information is the barrier to settlement, and the 
 
46. See, e.g., infra note 223. 
47. See Wu, supra note 45, at 705. 
48. See generally, Wu, When Code Isn’t Law, supra note 45, passim. 
Price 
Quantity 
Si 
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unknown and unknowable is what the government will do.49 
Conversely, if everyone knew what government was likely to do, or 
even knew the odds of government acting one way or another, 
settlement of copyright’s communications disputes would be fast. 
There are many reasons why government action will be hard to 
predict when new technologies of dissemination are invented. First, 
unlike, say, traffic accidents, there are relatively few inventions of 
major new dissemination technologies — in the twentieth century, at 
best about one per decade. There is therefore a thin market for paying 
off challenger industries wielding new technologies. Second, unlike a 
tort lawsuit, there are multiple government actors involved. Courts 
using copyright law may take one side, Congress another; antitrust law 
and the FCC make occasional cameo appearances.50 As a result, the 
odds of favorable government action are much harder to predict than 
in the settlement of a run-of-the-mill lawsuit. This inherent and 
historical unpredictability makes early settlement unlikely. Finally, not 
only is the direction of government action difficult to predict, but so is 
its effectiveness. Copyright enforcement can be costly and challenging. 
The knowledge that government action may be of unpredictable 
effectiveness increases the uncertainty that leads to copyright conflicts. 
What would happen in the absence of any government rules, 
regulations, decrees or other involvement? If the government denied 
an incumbent any possibility of obtaining protection from a 
technologically advanced challenger, then the incumbent’s strategy 
would depend on its capability for self-enforcement: its ability to 
protect its products and its producer surplus by nonlegal means. For 
example, in a world without government, broadcasters might have 
prevented the cable industry from “stealing” its signals by using 
physical force, or today, better scrambling of signals.51 Even with a 
copyright law, the recording industry currently uses nonlegal means to 
increase the costs of distributing its products online.52 
The effectiveness of such self-enforcement is likely unpredictable, 
and so total absence of government involvement would not necessarily 
lead to peace and agreement between competing disseminators. 
 
49. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 21.5 (4th ed. 1992) 
(observing that different estimates of the odds of favorable government action make 
settlement of lawsuits less likely). 
50. For a discussion of FCC involvement in radio see infra notes 109-159 and 
accompanying text. For a discussion of the involvement in the cable-broadcast dispute, see 
infra notes 188-260. 
51. Cf. Lee Kovarsky, Technological Substitution and the Arms-Race Theory of 
Copyright (draft on file with author) (arguing that copyright owners have a choice between 
seeking self-protection, copyright protection, or both). 
52. See Wu, supra note 45, at 743-45 (describing non-legal methods used by recording 
industry against online music distribution). 
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Again, what is most likely to lead to rapid settlement is predictable 
government action with known effects in any direction. 
From this discussion one might expect me to advocate greater 
predictability in order to minimize investments in seeking government 
favor, behavior that public choice theory considers wasteful “rent-
seeking.”53 But I have not argued here, as the classic rent-seeking 
literature would, that such expenditures are wasteful or undesirable. 
As Part II explains, the costs of rent-seeking may be worthwhile if it is 
unclear which technology is actually better, and if the rent-seeking 
process eventually allows the better technology to win out. Predictable 
government action — a hypothetical copyright dictator — could 
eliminate all conflict by choosing a winner but could also pick the 
wrong winner. So the costs of rent-seeking may be justified by a better 
substantive result. 
To summarize: the existence of unpredictable copyright protection 
and new technologies should produce long contests to obtain 
favorable governmental decisions. Because it is not obvious what 
government will do, incumbent industries — e.g., broadcasters, the 
recording industry, and sheet-music publishers, — can be expected to 
end up in long contests with challengers to persuade government to 
take favorable action. The result of such contests is copyright’s de 
facto communications regime. But this is quite a bare description. In 
the Sections that follow, we can see what government has done in the 
face of conflicts between challengers and incumbents, and how 
copyright’s communications policy has actually developed. 
D. Communications Policy, 1900-1976 
1. The Birth of the Recording Industry 
The birth of the recording industry in the late 1890s and early 
1900s is the model, for better of for worse, for copyright’s 
communications policy in the twentieth century. The recording 
industry, predating today’s online distribution via cable and other 
media, was the original technological free rider — the first to build a 
business whose success depended, in part, on the incidence of 
copyright arbitrage.54 
The recording industry pioneers were the manufacturers of piano 
rolls and of “talking machines,” or early record players. Early versions 
 
53. See Buchanan, supra note 43, at 4 (“The term rent seeking is designed to describe 
behavior in institutional settings where individual efforts to maximize value generate social 
waste rather than social surplus.” (emphasis in original)). 
54. For a discussion on copyright arbitrage, see Michael J. Meurer, Copyright Law and 
Price Discrimination, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 55 (2001) (applying economic models of price 
discrimination to copyright law). 
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of these technologies were introduced in the late 1890s.55 By 1902, at 
least a million piano rolls, each representing a copyrighted song, were 
in distribution.56 The record industry grew even faster: by 1899, 2.8 
million records had been sold.57 These mechanical reproductions were 
produced without paying any licensing fees to the owners of the 
respective copyrights.58 
Technologically, the player piano and the record player were each 
the “receiver” for a new form of mass media — the paper piano roll 
and the record, respectively. A single purchase of copyrighted sheet 
music could be transformed by the recording industry into rolls and 
records that reached tens of thousands of listeners. As a result, the 
success of mechanical recordings sparked a conflict with the 
incumbent industry: publishers of sheet music.59 
a. The rhetoric. The rhetoric of the early recording industry conflict 
is both independently fascinating and a template for other conflicts 
that followed. The incumbent owners of copyrights adopted a theme 
familiar to modern ears: they depicted the recording industry as 
irresponsible pirates whose reckless copying of music threatened to 
destroy American creativity. What was, in retrospect, a battle over the 
impact of new technology was at that time portrayed as a threat to 
traditional values and artistic development. As composer John Phillip 
Sousa informed Congress: 
These talking machines are going to ruin the artistic development of 
music in this country. When I was a boy . . . in front of every house in the 
summer evenings you would find young people together singing the 
songs of the day or the old songs. To-day you hear these infernal 
machines going night and day. We will not have a vocal chord left. The 
vocal chords will be eliminated by a process of evolution, as was the tail 
of man when he came from the ape.60 
 
55. See Jessica Litman, War Stories, 20 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 337, 350 nn.69-70 
(2002) (noting that composers did not earn royalties from these distribution mechanisms). 
56. See White-Smith Music Publ’g Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1, 9 (1908) (“The record 
discloses that in the year 1902 . . . from one million to one million and a half of such 
perforated musical rolls . . . were made in this country in that year.”). 
57. ANDRE MILLARD, AMERICA ON RECORD: A HISTORY OF RECORDED SOUND 49 
(1995). 
58. See White-Smith, 209 U.S. at 16-18; Litman, supra note 55, at 350 n.70. 
59. There were a number of legal battles between the two camps. See, e.g., White-Smith, 
209 U.S. 1, 18 (holding that 1897 Act did not assign composers right to piano roll 
reproduction of composition); Stern v. Rosey, 17 App. D.C. 562, 564-66 (1901) (refusing to 
hold phonograph presentation of sounds as a “copy” within the meaning of existing statute); 
Kennedy v. McTammany, 33 F. 584, 584-85 (C.C.D. Mass. 1888) (holding that perforated 
strips of paper used in tune-producing organettes do not violate copyrighted music of the 
same tune). 
60. Arguments Before the Comms. on Patents of the S. & H.R., Conjointly, on the Bills S. 
6330 and H.R. 19,853, to Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright, 59th Cong. 
24 (1906) [hereinafter 1906 Hearings] (statement of John Philip Sousa), reprinted in 4 
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Another line of argument portrayed the recording industry (“The 
Talking Machine Trust”) as a dishonest, monopolistic business. A 
model letter written for composers stated the case: 
[W]hat is the result? I see my compositions . . . stolen bodily by the 
phonograph trust and piano-player combination, and ground out daily 
from thousands of cylinders, disks, and rolls, without paying me or any of 
us one single, solitary penny . . . [Congress must] assist in protecting me 
against such robbery, such unfairness, and such a terrible disadvantage.61 
A slightly more sophisticated argument presented the recording 
industry’s activities as a threat to the incentives to compose music in 
the first place. In a 1907 letter to the New York Globe and Advertiser, 
the Authors and Composers’ Copyright League put things as follows: 
[T]he “Talking Machine Trust” . . . with all the greed of a hungry wolf 
seizes upon the composition and turns out countless records and 
perforated rolls, thereby killing the sales, for it is a proven fact that as 
soon as the penny talking machines reproduce a musical composition it is 
dead as far as the public is concerned. 
. . . . 
[Without copyright reform] the musical art and all other musical 
industries in this country will languish, as the authors and composers, not 
receiving any royalties on records, and their royalties on sheet music 
decreasing from year to year, will have no incentive to write or 
compose.62 
How about the challengers — the recording industry? Sounding 
themes also familiar today, the recording industry identified itself as 
the inventing class, heroes of American ingenuity and engineering. 
They portrayed the incumbent industry as a monopoly threat 
interested only in destroying a technologically advanced rival. 
Self-described inventor Howlett Davis, who testified before 
Congress “without invitation from any source whatever,”63 depicted 
the arts as necessarily dependent on inventors: “In all arts the work of 
the inventor will be found at the foundation of the progress and 
prosperity of the country.”64 Inventors, he argued, serve the people. 
“The farmer or the workingman,” he argued, relies on his record 
 
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 1909 COPYRIGHT ACT pt. H, at 24 (E. Fulton Brylawski & 
Abe Goldman eds., 1976). 
61. Hearings Before the Comms. on Patents of the S. & H.R. on Pending Bills to Amend 
and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright, 60th Cong. 255 (1908) [hereinafter 1908 
Hearings] (model letter to Congress in statement of John J. O’Connell) reprinted in 5 
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 1909 COPYRIGHT ACT pt. K, at 255 (E. Fulton Brylawski & 
Abe Goldman eds., 1976). 
62. Id. at 257 (newspaper letter in statement of John J. O’Connell). 
63. 1906 Hearings, supra note 60, at 97 (statement of G. Howlett Davis). 
64. Id. 
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player “to relax the tension of their daily labor.”65 He condemned 
expanded copyright as a plan to “take away from the inventor the 
product of his brain and to deliver it over to the composer.”66 “So far 
as the mass of the people of this country is concerned, the work of the 
composer is infinitesimal as compared with the work of the 
inventor.”67 
Inventors also argued that an expanded copyright would defeat 
their vested rights, both as an industry and, more particularly, the 
vested rights of inventors holding patents to mechanical players. 
Expanded copyright, Davis argued “practically depreciates or destroys 
the marketable value of my inventions or machines . . . as well as 
destroying in part or whole my existing patent rights.”68 His view, 
evidently, was that the patent grant included a right to be free from 
copyrights that might interfere with the value of the patent. 
A more strategic theme advanced by the early recording industry 
played on contemporary fears of monopoly trusts, particularly those 
with a foreign element. In a clever turn, much of the recording 
industry mobilized against a single manufacturer of player pianos, the 
Æolian Company. They argued that the demand for copyright 
expansion had nothing to do with composer welfare, but was rather 
part of a grand international conspiracy. Howlett Davis described the 
alleged collusion between publishers and composers as “a complete 
monopolistic octopus, in which the Æolian Company forms the head 
and brains, the Music Publishers’ Association the body, the 
independent publishers the writhing arms, and the composers the 
suckers and baiters.”69 
A series of inflammatory 1908 editorials in the newssheet “Musical 
Age” depicted a sinister international “syndicate” agitating for 
copyright’s expansion.70 It asked: “who raises this hue and cry and 
creates this clamorous demand for new and drastic [copyright] 
legislation? Is it the author? [No] . . . It is the speculator and gambler.” 
After detailing the syndicate’s origins in France (and in particular, its 
connection to a shadowy figure named Lucien Vives), the Æolian 
company was named as local outpost of the global conspiracy. “In this 
country, it is the Æolian company which assumes the role of ‘chief 
speculator.’” 
A final argument, also present in contemporary debate, was that 
the recording industry was actually helping composers by spurring the 
 
65. Id. at 103-04. 
66. Id. at 104. 
67. Id. 
68. Id. at 101. 
69. Id at 98. 
70. M. Dorian, The Men Behind, THE MUSICAL AGE, Feb. 29, 1908, at 76-77. 
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sales of sheet music; hence, no change to copyright was needed. A 
representative of the talking machine lobby stated that “[i]t is 
impossible that there should be any sale of records of the composition 
without there being a corresponding sale of the sheet music. Each may 
help the other, but phonograph reproduction is certainly a powerful 
stimulus to the sale of sheet music.”71 
This argument — that the new technology of dissemination will 
ultimately aid composers irrespective of the level of copyright 
protection granted to their works — remains a persistent theme in the 
defense of challenger activity. 
b. Copyright settlement. We are now in a position to understand the 
legal course of events that led to settlement. The incumbents, 
unsurprisingly, took the lead. Early on, publishers asked lower courts 
to find piano rolls (1888) and records (1901) an infringement of 
copyright rights.72 These efforts failed.73 
The incumbents, making the piracy arguments detailed above, then 
moved to Congress, achieving through a publishers’ conference a draft 
copyright bill that would have granted composers full rights in 
mechanical recordings.74 At the same time, in 1906, a new effort was 
made to obtain an appellate decision finding mechanical recordings to 
be infringing copies. The test lawsuit was litigated all the way to the 
Supreme Court: the now famous “piano-roll” case, White-Smith Music 
Publishing Co. v. Apollo Co.75 
Unfortunately for the incumbents, the Supreme Court was 
unwilling to extend copyright in the manner requested. It ruled that a 
“copy” in the statute was a “reproduction or duplication of the 
original,” which the perforated paper roll evidently was not. In 
hindsight it is clear that the decision could have gone either way.76 The 
Court repeatedly relied on the fact that piano rolls were not visually 
similar to sheet music — a curious means to adjudge the meaning of a 
“copy” of an aural work. 
 
71. 1908 Hearings, supra note 61, at 300 (statement of Frank L. Dyer). 
72. See Stern v. Rosey, 17 App. D.C. 562, 564-66 (1901) (refusing to hold phonograph 
presentation of sounds as a “copy” within the meaning of existing statute); Kennedy v. 
McTammany, 33 F. 584, 584-85 (C.C.D. Mass 1888) (holding that perforated strips of paper 
used in tune-producing organettes do not violate copyrighted music of the same tune). 
73. See Stern, 17 App. D.C. at 564-66; Kennedy, 33 F. at 584-85. 
74. See Litman, supra note 38, at 284-86. 
75. 209 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1908). 
76. The Court’s holding in White-Smith was premised on the notion that piano rolls did 
not constitute a physical copy of the work. White-Smith, 209 U.S. at 18. The Court did so 
because the rolls were not directly accessible to humans, and did so over the objection of 
Justice Holmes that “[o]n principle anything that mechanically reproduces that collocation 
of sounds ought to be held a copy . . . .” 209 U.S. at 20 (Holmes, J., concurring). This 
conception of fixation was quickly overturned by the copyright statute in 1909. See 17 U.S.C. 
§ 101 (2000) (defining fixation); see also Douglas Lichtman, Copyright as a Rule of Evidence, 
52 DUKE L.J. 683, 716 n.140 (2003) (discussing meaning of fixation). 
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Many have criticized the purported formalism of the White-Smith 
Court.77 Reflecting early twentieth century practice, the Court 
declined to explain the reasons or policy behind its decision. But the 
decision, whether consciously or not, put the Court squarely in the 
midst of communications policy. The doctrinal and rather clumsy 
rationale was the difference between a given work and its means of 
expression. The Court, critically, stated that “[t]he statute has not 
provided for the protection of the intellectual conception apart from 
the thing produced, however meritorious such conception may be.”78 It 
instead “has provided for the making and filing of a tangible thing, 
against the publication and duplication of which it is the purpose of 
the statute to protect the composer.”79 
The distinction between the “intellectual conception” and the 
“tangible thing” therein described is difficult to defend or maintain. If 
copyright is merely protection against the copying of a “tangible 
thing,” how could it protect adaptations to other languages, 
conversions to other media, or performance rights, for which the law 
has already provided? Yet the entire Court signed on to the opinion 
— even Justice Holmes, whose subsequent body of copyright writings 
would act against the principle stated in White-Smith.80 
For this reason we must look to other motivations and concerns. 
One cannot help noticing that the effect of the decision was to place a 
limit on the market power of the effective owner of the “intellectual 
conception,” namely, the incumbent industry. The decision also set an 
institutional precedent (though one unevenly followed) of deciding 
technologically sensitive copyright cases in favor of a challenger 
industry in a manner likely to force Congress’s hand. The denial of 
protection in the context of a technologically innovative market 
entrant will resurface in the history that follows. Seventy-six years 
later, the Sony decision would cite White-Smith as the origin of this 
“policy”: “Sound policy, as well as history, supports our consistent 
deference to Congress when major technological innovations alter the 
market for copyrighted materials.”81 In practice, the decision to 
“defer” to Congress activates copyright’s communications regime, and 
 
77. See, e.g., Jane C. Ginsburg, Copyright and Control over New Technologies of 
Dissemination, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1613, 1622 (2001). 
78. White-Smith, 209 U.S. at 17. 
79. Id. 
80. In Kalem Co. v. Harper Bros., 222 U.S. 55, 61 (1911), Justice Holmes held the film 
Ben-Hur to infringe a copyright on the novel, holding that “[t]he essence of the matter in the 
case last supposed is not the mechanism employed but that we see the event or story lived.” 
See also Herbert v. Shanley Co., 242 U.S. 591 (1917) (discussed infra in text accompanying 
notes 116-119). 
81. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 431 (1984). 
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the beginnings of a process of negotiated settlement between the 
parties to the conflict. 
* * * 
Following White-Smith publishers and the mechanical machine 
manufacturers moved quickly for a legislative settlement. Why 
settlement? 
First, the White-Smith litigation and the failure of earlier 
congressional efforts provided important information. Despite all its 
efforts, the publishing industry was unlikely to get either the courts or 
Congress to provide a full-strength copyright that it might use in its 
contest with the nascent recording industry. And by this time both 
challengers and incumbents began to represent a serious threat to one 
another. Following White-Smith, composers and publishers risked an 
ongoing decay of their profitability because of their inability to extract 
income from the recording industry. Conversely, the recording 
industry still faced some possibility that publishers would succeed in 
their efforts to extend copyright to mechanical recordings and use this 
power against them. 
Under these conditions the two parties settled on a statutory 
“royalty” scheme that was the first compulsory license system. The 
settlement was centered on a fixed, universal rate of two cents per 
song, per copy. This settlement was primarily achieved during sessions 
in 1908, and was codified as section 1(e) of the 1909 Copyright Act.82 
The nature of the settlement was as follows: on the one hand, 
Congress extended the copyright in compositions to mechanical 
recordings. In exchange, the recording industry received statutorily 
guaranteed access to all copyrighted compositions provided they pay a 
standard fee. So long as the composer agreed or “knowingly 
acquiesced” to an initial recording (an important condition), anyone 
willing to pay the statutory fee would then be entitled to use any 
copyrighted composition to record his own version of the song. 
This mechanical license scheme survives to the present day. 
Among academics it is occasionally praised for reducing transaction 
costs, but more typically berated for its inflexibility and insensitivity to 
changing economic conditions.83 Yet interestingly, neither party has 
made a serious effort to repeal the mechanical license system. 
Representatives of composers did not argue for its repeal in the 1976 
 
82. See HARRY G. HENN, COPYRIGHT PRIMER 207 n.2 (1979). 
83. See, e.g., I. Trotter Hardy, Copyright and “New-Use” Technologies, 23 NOVA L. 
REV. 659, 699-702 (1999) (criticizing compulsory licensing regimes as price-fixing); Robert P. 
Merges, Contracting into Liability Rules: Intellectual Property Rights and Collective Rights 
Organizations, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1293, 1300 (1996) (same). 
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Copyright Act84 and today it is defended both by representatives of 
composers and by the music industry.85 The only change has been the 
effort to make the license fee adjustable.86 
2. The Wireless Age 
“Radio is yet in its infancy,” the doctor concluded, as he rose to go. 
“But one thing is certain. In the lifetime of those who witnessed its 
birth it will become a giant — but a benevolent giant who, instead of 
destroying will re-create our civilization.”87 
Thus spoke Dr. Dale, sage of the 1922 book Radio Boys.88 He had 
reason to think radio was on the rise. Just one year earlier, a record 
300,000 listened as boxer Jack Dempsey, the Manassa Mauler, 
knocked out Georges Carpentier to defend the heavyweight title. For 
perhaps the first time in history, more people experienced the event 
distally than locally, most listening at “radio halls.”89 According to the 
Wireless Age: “The magic of the radio telephone had accomplished 
new wonders. A daring idea had become a fact.”90 
But the wonder of radio also gave birth to a festering, drawn-out 
conflict: a decades-long war between the broadcast industry and an 
alliance of sheet music publishers, composers and songwriters. The 
conflict differs in an important respect from the piano roll and cable 
broadcast disputes that came before and after it, respectively. There 
was no incumbent broadcast industry interested in destroying or 
stopping radio. Instead, existing authors wanted radio to succeed, but 
they also wanted to milk radio for as much money as possible. Radio’s 
interest in paying as little as possible for its primary input created the 
conflict described in what follows. 
Commercial radio, like most new disseminator industries, began its 
history accused of copyright piracy. Unlike modern radio with its “disc 
jockeys,” early 1920s broadcast usually meant setting up a microphone 
 
84. 17 U.S.C. § 115 (2000). 
85. See, e.g., Ken Anderson, Preserve the Compulsory License, BILLBOARD, June 11, 
1994, at 6 (arguing that rescinding the compulsory license would create industry turmoil and 
potential of monopolization). 
86. The price is now set by a system of ad hoc Copyright Arbitration Royalty Panels. See 
17 U.S.C. § 801 (2000) (creating the Copyright Arbitration Royalty Panels). For the year 
2004, the mechanical license rate is 8.5 cents per song, or 1.65 cents per minute of playing 
time, whichever is greater. See COPYRIGHT OFFICE, COPYRIGHT ROYALTY RATES, at 
http://www.copyright.gov/carp/m200a.html (last visited Sept. 10, 2004). 
87. ALLEN CHAPMAN, THE RADIO BOYS TRAILING A VOICE 60 (1922). 
88. Id. 
89. See Voice-Broadcasting the Stirring Progress of the “Battle of the Century”: How the 
Largest Audience in History Heard the Description of the Dempsey-Carpentier Contest 
Through the Use of the Radiophone, THE WIRELESS AGE, August, 1921, page 11-21, at 11. 
90. Id at 11. 
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for a performance, either within the studio or at a concert hall.91 Since 
the music was already purchased or playing, ignoring copyright was 
easy. But radio faced an organized adversary: the American Society of 
Broadcasters, Composers and Publishers (ASCAP). 
In 1913, the legend goes, composer Victor Herbert was dining in 
New York’s Shanley’s Restaurant when the in-house orchestra struck 
up one of his songs, “Sweethearts.”92 He complained to the proprietor, 
who presented him with a theory of copyright liability: since no 
admission was being charged, the performance was not “for profit,” 
and the restaurant not guilty of infringement. Herbert was determined 
to prove him wrong and in 1914, with others, founded the ASCAP, a 
collection of 170 authors and composers of music, along with 22 
publishers of sheet music.93 The ASCAP’s first target was the 
restaurant and the performance that had attracted Herbert’s ire. In 
Herbert v. Shanley Co., the ASCAP convinced the Supreme Court that 
public performance in restaurants, despite no fee being charged, was 
an unauthorized “public performance for profit.”94 
Justice Holmes wrote a simple three-paragraph opinion, 
concluding that since restaurants are not charities, when they play 
music it must be in the interest of profit even if they do not charge at 
the door. Restaurants, he observed, are not “eleemosynary.”95 They 
provide music to provide their customers, “people having limited 
powers of conversation . . . a luxurious pleasure not to be had from 
eating a silent meal.” In short, “[i]f music did not pay it would be given 
up. If it pays it pays out of the public’s pocket. Whether it pays or not 
the purpose of employing it is profit and that is enough.”96 
The opinion is simple economics, but underlying it is a substantive 
view of the rights of the copyright holder. Holmes’s opinion here and 
in his other writings97 saw copyright as a commercial property to an 
extent never reached before. His view, now mainstream, presumed the 
copyright owner should have the power to demand a license for every 
revenue stream dependent on the copyrighted work — even revenue 
from adaptations to other media, or revenue arising from improved 
 
91. See Stephen Davis, The Law of the Air, in THE RADIO INDUSTRY: THE STORY OF 
ITS DEVELOPMENT 186-87 (1928). 
92. See EDWARD SAMUELS, THE ILLUSTRATED STORY OF COPYRIGHT 41 (David 
Stanford Burr ed., Thomas Dunne Books 2000); Leonard Allen, The Battle of Tin Pan Alley, 
181 HARPER’S MAG. 514, 516 (1940). 
93. See 2 MELVIN NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 8.19 (1988). 
94. Herbert, 242 U.S. 591 (1917). 
95. Id. at 594. 
96. Id. at 595. 
97. See, e.g., Kalem Co. v. Harper Bros., 222 U.S. 55, 63 (1911) (suggesting jobber could 
be contributorily liable for unauthorized film version of book); Bleistein v. Donaldson 
Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239 (1903) (holding commercial advertisement copyrightable). 
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restaurant atmospherics. This, this Herbert principle, has had a 
powerful impact on copyright's theory and evolution. It also put the 
ASCAP in the business in which it remains today: offering “blanket” 
licenses to restaurants, dance halls, and other places that perform 
music.98 The blanket licenses, for a fixed percentage dependent on the 
venue, allow the performance of all of the works written by ASCAP 
members (members assign their performance rights to the ASCAP for 
this purpose).99 It was these blanket licenses that the ASCAP offered 
radio broadcasters, at first for free or for very low prices. But much of 
the broadcast radio industry refused, and several decades of ferocious 
animosity ensued. 
Facing the demands of the ASCAP and feeling a sense of mutual 
grievance, radio decided to get organized. On April 25, 1923, fifty-four 
broadcasting men met at the Drake Hotel in Chicago.100 The product 
of their meeting was the National Association of Broadcasters (NAB), 
and its first priority was getting radio out of the copyright statute.101 
Within a year, the NAB had a bill in the Senate that would have 
exempted radio from copyright liability altogether.102 The bill, S. 2600, 
proposed to amend section 1 of the 1909 Act, adding: 
[C]opyright control shall not extend to public performances whether for 
profit or without profit, of musical compositions where such performance 
is made from printed or written sheets or by reproducing devices issued 
under the authority of the owner of the copyright, or by use of the radio 
or telephone, or both.103 
But the bill died, and in retrospect the radio problem probably never 
came closer to a legislative solution. 
The broadcaster-composer conflict was open by the time of the 
1925 Radio Convention, called by the Commerce Department, where 
an early effort was made to settle the dispute. Notes from the meeting 
show that the two sides agreed upon several points, including that 
“there can be no continuation of broadcasting unless musical 
compositions are made available to broadcasters upon a fair, 
 
98. See Buffalo Broad. Co., Inc. v. Am. Soc’y of Composers, Authors & Publishers, 546 
F. Supp. 274, 277 (S.D.N.Y. 1982). 
99. See id. at 276. 
100. See NAB: The First 75 Years, at http://www.nab.org/about/timeline.asp (last visited 
Jan. 24, 2004). 
101. See Angela J. Cambell, Self-Regulation and the Media, 51 FED. COMM. L.J. 711, 720 
n.49 (1999). 
102. To Amend the Copyright Act: Hearings Before a Subcomm. of the Comm. on 
Patents on S. 2600, 68th Cong., 9-14 (1924) (statements of E.F. McDonald and Paul B. 
Klugh). 
103. S. 2600, 94th Cong. (1924). 
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equitable, and permanent basis.”104 Nonetheless, “all attempted 
solutions through negotiation . . . have proved unavailing.”105 It was 
resolved that Congress should settle things, but it never did. 
The parties were probably unwilling to settle because each was in 
the midst of pursuing its own legal strategy seeking total victory. 
While the NAB unsuccessfully petitioned Congress, the ASCAP was 
doing far better in the courts.106 Unlike White-Smith and later cases, no 
radio cases reached the Supreme Court, mainly because the holdings 
followed Herbert. So instead it was the Sixth Circuit whose word 
became policy for radio.107 
In 1924, the ASCAP brought a test case against radio station 
WLW in Cincinnati for its unlicensed broadcast of a song named 
“Dreamy Melody.”108 The legal question was whether a radio 
broadcast was in fact a “public performance for profit” under the 
statute. The Sixth Circuit, following Holmes in Herbert v. Shanley Co., 
answered the question “yes.”109 Said the court: “The artist is 
consciously addressing a great, though unseen and widely scattered, 
audience, and is therefore participating in a public performance.”110 
What of White-Smith’s practice of leaving new technologies to 
Congress? The broadcasters did in fact argue that the fate of radio was 
better handled by the legislature, and Judge Mack duly noted that 
“[b]ills have been introduced in both House and Senate to permit 
broadcasting without infringing copyrights.”111 While agreeing that the 
final status was “eminently [a matter] for considered legislation,” the 
court nonetheless felt it had a duty to “decide whether and to what 
extent statutes covering the subject-matter generally . . . are, fairly 
construed, applicable to the new situation.”112 The extension of the 
Copyright Act’s text to a new technology — the opposite approach to 
that adopted in White-Smith and later Supreme Court cases — was a 
turning point in the history of the radio conflict. 
 
104. Proceedings of the Fourth National Radio Conference and Recommendations for 
the Regulation of Radio, Nov. 9-11, 1925, at 37-38 (Government Printing Office 1926). 
105. Id. 
106. The litigation brought by composers was quite successful, particularly with respect 
to the public performance right. See, e.g., Jerome H. Remick & Co. v. Am. Auto. 
Accessories Co., 5 F.2d 411 (6th Cir. 1925) (enjoining defendant from radio broadcasting); 
M. Witmark & Sons v. L. Bamberger & Co., 291 F. 776, 780 (D.N.J. 1923) (holding that 
broadcasting in department store was “publicly for profit” within the meaning of the 
Copyright Act); Harms v. Cohen, 279 F. 276 (E.D. Pa. 1922) (assessing liability against a 
theater employing an organist playing copyrighted musical compositions). 
107. See infra notes 130-134 and accompanying text. 
108. Jerome H. Remick & Co., 5 F.2d 411 (6th Cir. 1925). 
109. Id. at 412. 
110. Id. 
111. Id. at 411. 
112. Id. at 411-12. 
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The ASCAP’s victory in the Sixth Circuit carried forward to other 
courts and other decisions,113 as the Supreme Court denied certiorari. 
The radio broadcasters had lost the first round, having no legislation 
and no excuse. By 1931, they had little recourse but to begin paying 
for ASCAP blanket licenses, and most began doing so. 
It may be correct, as Jane Ginsburg argues, that the radio courts 
did not sense any risk that the ASCAP wanted to destroy radio, and 
that this may have affected both their decisions and the Supreme 
Court’s denials of certiorari.114 But if one goal of the radio cases was to 
settle the relationship between radio and copyright once and for all, 
they were a failure. The declaration of the rights of the copyright 
holders was not a settlement of the conflict. The fight moved past 
copyright to other legal strategies which served, as a 1941 
commentator put it, to “deaden the effectiveness of the copyright 
law.”115 As we will see, after another three decades of continuous 
conflict, antitrust law eventually imposed the settlement that the 
copyright courts avoided. 
In the mid-1930s, the NAB pushed the federal “Duffy Bill,” 
targeting the remedies instead of the scope of copyright. Because 
actual damages from copyright infringement could be minimal or 
difficult to demonstrate, broadcasters noted that it was only the in 
terrorum effect of statutory damages that compelled compliance. The 
Duffy Bill would have repealed the statutory damage provisions of the 
1909 Copyright Act.116 As a commentator in the 1940s stated, “[i]f the 
minimum statutory damages were abolished, radio owners could 
knowingly ignore the copyright laws . . . .”117 But with only the 
broadcasters behind it, the Duffy Bill died. 
As early as 1926, the NAB also began pressuring the Justice 
Department to seek antitrust enforcement against the ASCAP, but to 
no avail.118 In September 1933, the broadcasters filed their own private 
antitrust suit,119 and in 1934 the Justice Department, with the 
broadcasters as cheering squad, changed its mind and filed its own 
 
113. Pastime Amusement Co. v. M. Witmark & Sons, 2 F.2d 1020 (4th Cir. 1924); M. 
Witmark & Sons v. L. Bamberger & Co., 291 F. 776, 779-80 (D.N.J. 1923). 
114. See Ginsburg, supra note 20, at 1619-21. 
115. See Marcus Cohn, Music, Radio Broadcasters and the Sherman Act, 29 GEO. L.J. 
407, 415 (1941). 
116. S. 2465, 74th Cong. § 17 (1935) (limiting damages to the copyright owner’s actual 
damages and the infringer’s profits). 
117. Cohn, supra note 115, at 416. 
118. In 1926, the Justice Department investigated ASCAP but found no reason to bring 
an antitrust suit. See Cohn, supra note 115, at 424 n.91. 
119. See Pennsylvania Broadcasting Co. v. Buck, (S.D.N.Y. , filed Sept. 7, 1933). 
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antitrust petition against the ASCAP.120 But the government asked for 
an adjournment after just two weeks of trial.121 The radio broadcasters’ 
legal strategy was again stalled. 
Having no luck with the federal government, the radio 
broadcasters turned to the states. The result was called “a series of 
comprehensive and systematic attacks on the ASCAP, through the 
medium of state legislatures.”122 The methods of choice were “anti-
monopoly” statutes that declared it illegal for owners of copyrighted 
works to combine for purposes of fixing licensing fees.123 In other 
words, the broadcasters sought and obtained state statutes making the 
ASCAP illegal. Over several years, the broadcasters succeeded in 
introducing such laws in thirty-five states and passing them in ten.124 
Unfortunately for broadcasters, however, courts quickly found the 
state laws preempted by the federal commerce power.125 The NAB’s 
efforts had failed again. 
As an ASCAP commentator in 1939 put it, the broadcasters “had 
resorted to every conceivable device and stratagem to destroy the 
right of composers and authors to bargain collectively . . . . All to no 
purpose.”126 But the NAB was persistent. It compared its struggle 
against the ASCAP to the fight against Hitler and redoubled its 
efforts: “War is Hell, whether its purpose is to preserve democracy in 
Europe against a madcap dictator or to preserve it in radio against an 
arbitrary totalitarian ASCAP.”127 
The broadcasters’ breakthrough came in 1941. That year, NAB ran 
a successful year-long boycott of all ASCAP songs, relying instead on 
songs in the public domain and those from the industry’s own 
performance rights organization, Broadcast Music, Inc. (BMI).128 This 
 
120. See United States v. Am. Soc’y of Composers, Authors & Publishers, No. 78-388 
(S.D.N.Y., filed August 30, 1934). 
121. Why they stopped the case is not entirely clear. According to Lionel Sobel, it was in 
part because the broadcasters and ASCAP agreed on a five-year compromise agreement 
during the trial. See Lionel S. Sobel, The Music Business and the Sherman Act: An Analysis 
of the “Economic Realities” of Blanket Licensing, 3 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 1, 5 (1983). 
122. Cohn, supra note 115, at 416. 
123. Two examples are 1937 Fla. Laws c. 17807, discussed in Gibbs v. Buck, 307 U.S. 66, 
69 (1939), and 1937 Wash. Laws 218, discussed in Buck v. Gallagher, 307 U.S. 95, 97 (1939). 
124. See Cohn, supra note 115, at 417 nn.60-63 (collecting state statutes). 
125. See, e.g., Gibbs, 307 U.S. 66 (1939); Buck v. Harton, 33 F. Supp. 1014 (M.D. Tenn. 
1940); Buck v. Swanson, 33 F. Supp. 377 (D. Neb. 1939); Notes and Legislation, Musical 
Monopolies and Legislative Control, 53 HARV. L. REV. 458 (1940) (collecting cases). 
126. E.C. Mills, Current Comment, The ASCAP-NAB Controversy: The ASCAP View, 
11 AIR. L. REV. 394, 397 (1940). 
127. Editorial, War, Hell and ASCAP, BROADCASTING, Oct. 1, 1939, at 48. 
128. In 1940, the NAB organized an ASCAP boycott — members, for about a year, only 
played songs from their own, competing performing rights society, Broadcast Music Inc. 
(“BMI”). See Cohn, supra note 115, at 420-421. 
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time fate and history were on the broadcast industry’s side. The 
ASCAP didn’t control every composer and every song: it required 
composers to achieve a minimum of five hit songs before joining.129 
This standard excluded less well known artists and also “hillbilly” and 
“race” music (now known as “country” and “rhythm and blues,” 
respectively).130 Switching to playlists comprising BMI and public 
domain songs was therefore manageable, if not ideal.131 
The Justice Department, meanwhile, was convinced to bring yet 
another antitrust action. This time, the ASCAP decided to negotiate a 
settlement, resulting in the 1941 consent decree.132 This, in turn, was 
renegotiated in 1950,133 after the movie industry joined in and filed a 
successful antitrust action against the ASCAP.134 
The details of the antitrust litigation against the ASCAP have been 
told many times.135 What is relevant here is that the results of the 
antitrust litigation and settlement were quite similar to those of 
copyright settlements achieved elsewhere. 
The 1950 decree limited the scope of copyright in compositions 
rather like a statutory or compulsory license. Section VI of the decree 
ordered the ASCAP to grant blanket licenses to its copyrights, and 
section IV required the ASCAP to grant such licenses non-exclusively 
and without discrimination.136 These are, of course, the basic features 
of a compulsory license: it guarantees that the work will be available, 
and it remains available regardless of how many other parties have 
already received a compulsory license. 
 
129. See PAUL KINGSBURY, BMI 50TH ANNIVERSARY HISTORY BOOK 2 (1990) (“At 
one time, many types of music had limited access to the mainstream of the American music 
business, and to the American audience at large.”). 
130. See id. 
131. Herman Finkelstein, an ASCAP attorney, stated in 1954 that during the boycott 
“the value of radio sets was substantially lessened for those who enjoyed the best in popular 
music.” Herman Finkelstein, The Composer and the Public Interest — Regulation of 
Performing Right Societies, 19 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 275, 287 (1954). Conversely, some 
radio stations reported that their public praised them for the new type of music they 
broadcasted during the boycott. See WFBL Optimistic on BMI, VARIETY, Dec. 25, 1940, at 
24. 
132. United States v. Am. Soc’y of Composers, Authors & Publishers, 1940-1943 Trade 
Cas. (CCH) ¶ 56,104 (S.D.N.Y. 1941). 
133. See United States v. Am. Soc’y of Composers, Authors & Publishers, 1950 Trade 
Cas. (CCH) ¶ 62,595, at 63,751 (S.D.N.Y. 1950). 
134. See Alden-Rochelle, Inc. v. Am. Soc’y of Composers, Authors & Publishers, 80 F. 
Supp. 888 (S.D.N.Y. 1948). 
135. See, e.g., Richard W. Ergo, Comment, ASCAP and the Antitrust Laws: The Story of 
a Reasonable Compromise, 1959 DUKE L.J. 258 (1959); Susan Stager, Musical Performing 
Rights in the Television Industry: Has the Blanket License Finally Seen Its Demise?, 14 SW. U. 
L. REV. 569, 572-73 (1984). 
136. See United States v. Am. Soc’y of Composers, Authors & Publishers, 1950 Trade 
Cas. (CCH) at 63,753. 
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The 1950 consent decree, like a statutory license, also had 
something to say about pricing. Unlike the mechanical license, which 
set a statutory price (two cents per song per recording), the 1950 
consent decree gave an Article III court the final say in music pricing. 
Section IX of the 1950 consent decree required the ASCAP to notify 
users of its fees, which were to be reasonable. In the event that the 
ASCAP and its users could not agree on a price within sixty days, 
appeal was available to the district court, which would set a 
“reasonable price.”137 
Under these terms, the legal regulation of broadcast music 
effectively became a form of liability, as opposed to property, 
regime.138 Broadcasters were not liable for infringement as long as 
they paid a price set by the government. The story of the birth of 
radio, in short, has more in common with other copyright conflicts 
than meets the eye. The initial decision of the copyright courts to 
extend full copyright in radio broadcasts did not prevent the 
emergence of a compulsory licensing scheme. 
3. Cable Television & the Broadcasting Industry 
The third major example of what I have described as copyright’s 
settlement function arises out of the bitter mid-century conflict 
between broadcasters and the upstart cable industry. Reduced to its 
essentials, beginning in the late 1950s the broadcast industry and its 
affiliates mounted a large, successful effort to contain the growth of 
cable using every regulatory and political device at their disposal,139 
while the cable industry capitalized on its unregulated status to erode 
the dominant position of broadcast.140 
A general (albeit uneasy) settlement to the conflict was achieved 
by the late 1970s through a compromise on copyright legislation and 
the rescission of the most onerous of the FCC’s regulations and 
 
137. See id at 63,754. Rate-setting requests have been brought to the Court, but have 
always been settled before the merits are reached. See W. Michael Garner, United States v. 
ASCAP: The Licensing Provisions of the Amended Final Judgment of 1950, 23 BULL. 
COPYRIGHT SOC’Y 119, 127-28 (1976). 
138. For the seminal discussion of property versus liability rules, see Guido Calabresi & 
A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the 
Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972). 
139. For a very brief history of the relationship among cable, the FCC, and Congress, 
see Ashutosh Bhagwat, Of Markets and Media: The First Amendment, the New Mass Media, 
and the Political Components of Culture, 74 N.C. L. REV. 141, 150-55 (1995). 
140. See Thomas W. Hazlett, The Wireless Craze, the Unlimited Bandwidth Myth, the 
Spectrum Auction Faux Pas, and the Punchline to Ronald Coase’s “Big Joke”: an Essay on 
Airwave Allocation Policy, 14 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 335, 416-17 (2001). 
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pseudo-copyrights.141 With this settlement, cable began a smoother 
accession to its present domination of television dissemination.142 
a. The challenge. Cable was not, at first, a challenger to the 
broadcast industry. The first cable systems, then known as 
“community antenna” television (CATV), developed in rural areas in 
the late 1940s. The goal of the early deployments was modest: solving 
the problem of bringing broadcast television to remote or 
mountainous areas otherwise left in the dark.143 In the late 1940s, early 
cable operators in places like Astoria, Oregon (the site of the first 
recognized CATV deployment) erected large, community antennas to 
bring distant signals to small towns.144 The broadcast signal captured 
by the community antenna was retransmitted to people’s homes using 
physical cables.145 
In this early manifestation, cable simply complemented broadcast 
service.146 By allowing the broadcast signal to reach areas not served 
by broadcast, it expanded the television audience to the advantage of 
broadcast stations. This changed, however, by the late 1950s, when 
broadcasters realized cable’s threat as a successor industry. 
Broadcasters had reason to fear. Cable technology had two clear 
advantages over broadcast technology that are now obvious: 
programming diversity147 (more channels) and signal quality. In the 
face of this competitive threat, the broadcast industry adopted the 
familiar arguments of piracy,148 unfair competition,149 and economic 
 
141. See , e.g., Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 415 U.S. 394, 414 
(1974) (refusing to apply copyright law in the cable retransmission context); Fortnightly 
Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390, 399-402 (1968) (holding that cable TV 
is a “viewer” and therefore does not “perform” within the meaning of the controlling 
copyright law). Congress “settled” this dispute by promulgating a cable compulsory licensing 
scheme. See 17 U.S.C. § 111 (2000). 
142. See Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, 47 U.S.C. 
§ 521(a)(2)-(5) (2000) (detailing the increase in cable viewership and noting that “the cable 
television industry has become a dominant nationwide video medium”). 
143. See Kent D. Wakeford, Note, Municipal Cable Franchising: An Unwarranted 
Intrusion into Competitive Markets, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 233, 237 n.16 and accompanying text 
(1995). 
144. See id. n.15. 
145. See id. 
146. See Patrick Murphy, Note, Retransmission Consent: A Mixed Signal for Cable 
Copyright, 17 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 237, 240 (1993) (describing this model). 
147. In the 1960s, diversity meant the importing of signals from other areas using 
microwave transmission technology. See Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 
415 U.S. 394, 400 n.4 (1974) (describing microwave transmission technology). For example, 
to create an attractive service, a cable operator in Philadelphia might import independent 
stations from New York City in order to offer a broader selection of content than available 
from broadcast alone. 
148. This was the rhetoric surrounding, for example, the compulsory-license provisions 
allowing cable to rebroadcast captured signals. See Mary C. Dollarhide, Note, Surrogate Rule 
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disruption favored by incumbent industries. In other words, it adopted 
the arguments of the sheet music manufacturers in the piano-roll era 
and of the record companies today.150 Along with these claims of unfair 
competition, the broadcast industry added appeals to “localism,” the 
national policy of subsidizing the existence of local broadcasting 
stations in every community. 
The unfair competition or piracy claim was simply that cable 
operators, because they did not pay for the content they retransmitted, 
were stealing content and competing unfairly. Rhetorically, the 
broadcast industry openly and repeatedly accused cable operators of 
“signal piracy.” As the copyright office summarized their argument in 
1965: “[Cable operators] neither need nor deserve a free ride at the 
expense of copyright owners . . . . The activities of the CATV 
operators constitute a ‘clear moral wrong’ comparable to the old 
practice of ‘bicycling’ movies from one theater to another in order to 
get two performances out of one license.”151 
As a local broadcaster testified in 1958: “We believe that when a 
community antenna system takes our programs out of the air, without 
our permission, and sells that program material at a profit — and in 
many cases, a fantastic profit, indeed — this is a violation of our 
property rights.”152 
Jack Valenti of the Motion Picture Association made similar 
arguments on the eve of settlement, June 1975, in testimony before 
Congress: 
If the Congress exempts television — cable television — from 
copyright . . . [it] will not only be magnifying and sanctifying a terrible 
injustice, but it will have created a huge parasite in the marketplace, 
feeding and fattening itself off of local television stations and copyright 
owners of copyrighted material. We do not like it because we think it 
wrong and unfair.153 
 
Making: Problems and Possibilities Under the Administrative Procedure Act, 61 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 1017, 1027 (1988). 
149. The Supreme Court accepted the unfair competition rationale in Turner 
Broadcasting System, Inc. v. F.C.C., 512 U.S. 622, 652 (1994) (“In short, the must-carry 
provisions are not designed to favor or disadvantage speech of any particular content. 
Rather, they are meant to protect broadcast television from what Congress determined to be 
unfair competition by cable systems.” (emphasis added)). 
150. See supra, text accompanying notes 60-71. 
151. HOUSE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, 89TH CONG., COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION 
PART 6 SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS ON THE GENERAL 
REVISION OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW: 1965 REVISION BILL 42 (Comm. Print 1965). 
152. Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, United 
States Senate, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1959) (statement of William C. Grove). 
153. See U.S. Cong. House Comm. on the Judiciary Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties 
and the Administration of Justice Hearings, 92d Cong. (1972) (statement of Jack Valenti), 
reprinted in 15 OMNIBUS COPYRIGHT REVISION LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 727 (George S. 
Grossman ed., 1976). 
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Broadcasters associated themselves with the creation of 
programming content and linked cable to the destruction of incentives 
for creation. The incumbents argued that the creation of programming 
rested on a delicate balance of incentives: broadcasters paid for the 
creation of the programming content and received local advertising 
revenue in return, serving the public interest by creating new works. 
Cable operators, on the other hand, did not create new works and 
therefore competed unfairly. 
But if cable simply carried broadcast signals, how did it endanger 
broadcasting or the creation of new works? The broadcasters’ 
arguments relied on the concept of audience fragmentation.154 They 
argued that the cable operators’ practice of importing signals from 
“foreign” markets (i.e., from Memphis to St. Louis) would fragment 
the viewing audiences between local stations and the foreign 
imports.155 Imports would destroy advertising revenue because St. 
Louis advertisers, faced with an audience fragmented between stations 
of both cities, would pay less. Meanwhile, since local advertisers in 
Memphis had no interest in reaching buyers in St. Louis audiences, the 
result was a net loss in the amount broadcasters could charge for 
advertising.156 Broadcasters charged that the fragmentation problem 
would destroy the economic viability of free television. 
The broadcast industry advanced concerns for “localism” in 
addition to those regarding audience fragmentation.157 The FCC in 
1952 declared localism a goal of national broadcasting policy: 
broadcast should “provide each community with at least one television 
broadcast station.”158 The idea was that the public interest was served 
not only by the programming of the “big three” networks, but also by 
local broadcast stations that could provide content on matters of local 
importance.159 Cable operators, by importing signals, were a 
particularly serious threat to the viability of local broadcasters in small 
markets. 
Finally, even if cable did offer desirable diversity in programming, 
broadcasters argued that the goal of diversity was better achieved 
through more broadcast stations in every community, not the import 
 
154. See, e.g., United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 160 n.4 (detailing 
concerns regarding fragmentation in the San Diego market). 
155. See id. 
156. See id. 
157. Localism as a concept is discussed in Glen O. Robinson, The Electronic First 
Amendment: An Essay for the New Age, 47 DUKE L.J. 899, 904 (1998). 
158. See Report and Order, 17 Fed. Reg. 3912 (1952). 
159. See id. 
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and export of signals around the country.160 In particular, broadcasters 
promoted developing new ultra-high frequency (UHF) stations as the 
preferred means for achieving programming diversity.161 
In retrospect, the weakness of these arguments is apparent. Cable 
was indeed a threat to broadcasting because it was a better means of 
disseminating television. Yet it did not follow that cable was also a 
threat to programming, because it could (and did) ultimately develop 
an interest in the availability of new works. In particular, cable, as 
most now recognize, was the savior of UHF broadcasting because it 
improved the weak signal strength of UHF stations.162 In retrospect, 
the key would be to make cable a stakeholder — part of the 
compensation system for newly created works — without giving 
broadcast a tool to destroy its rival. This, ultimately, was the role that 
the copyright liability scheme would play. 
b. Controlling the challenger. Faced with the competitive threat of 
cable, in the 1960s the broadcast industry and its allies163 exploited all 
available regulatory means to control the growth of cable. The 
industry pursued three separate legal strategies: common-law 
misappropriation arguments, copyright infringement litigation, and a 
kind of “pseudo-copyright” through FCC regulation. 
The TV broadcast industry turned first to the common law in an 
effort to gain property rights in its broadcast signals. Beginning in the 
late 1950s, the broadcasters asked the courts to find the behavior of 
cable companies a violation of common-law misappropriation under 
International News Service v. Associated Press and other common-law 
theories.164 The argument in these lawsuits was simple: cable operators 
are stealing our product (the signal) without providing compensation, 
are therefore competing unfairly, and should be stopped. In 
International News Service, this basic theory had persuaded the 
Supreme Court to prevent one wire service from stealing news from 
 
160. These arguments were reflected in the 1958 “Cox Report” on cable television. See 
Kenneth Cox, The Problem of Television Service for Smaller Communities. Staff Report to 
the Senate Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 26 Dec. 1958. 
161. See id. 
162. See Joel Rosenbloom, The “Vast Wasteland” in Retrospect, 55 FED. COMM. L.J. 571, 
575 (2003) (citing BRUCE M. OWEN & STEVEN S. WILDMAN, VIDEO ECONOMICS 214-15 
(1992)). 
163. An example of an ally is the manufacturers of television antennas, organized as the 
Television Accessory Manufacturers’ Institute (“TAME”), who obviously had much to lose 
from competition with cable. See DON R. LE DUC, CABLE TELEVISION AND THE FCC 142-
143 (1972). 
164. 248 U.S. 215 (1918). Int’l News Serv. held that news wires have a quasi-property 
right in hot news. See id. at 245-46. The broadcasters also argued for tortious interference 
with contract, see Associated Press v. Int’l News Serv., 240 F. 983, 995 (S.D.N.Y. 1917), but 
the misappropriation theory received the most attention in the court of appeals. See 
Associated Press v. Int’l News Serv., 245 F. 244, 252 (2d Cir. 1917). 
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another, creating a pseudo-property interest in hot news.165 Such a 
right would have served broadcasting’s interests perfectly. 
But these efforts failed. In closely watched litigation, the Ninth 
Circuit held that the broadcasters’ remedy, if any, must lie in 
copyright.166 Pointing out that the broadcasters sought “what are in 
essence copyright interests,” the court found the state grounds for 
protecting broadcasters’ rights federally preempted.167 The case was 
decided on the authority of two recently decided intellectual property 
preemption cases: Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co.168 and Compco 
Corporation v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc.169 The court recognized that 
the common law right threatened the “primary right of public access 
to all in the public domain . . . .”170 It reasoned that the creation of “a 
new protectible interest . . . [would] ‘interfere with the federal 
policy . . . of allowing free access to copy whatever the federal patent 
and copyright laws leave in the public domain.’”171 
On the other hand, the FCC was seemingly immune to such 
concerns. With the FCC’s regulation of cable began a tradition of 
using the FCC to achieve regulatory outcomes that had been rejected 
by Congress or the copyright courts (and vice versa). Bit by bit, urged 
on by broadcasters, the FCC created a regime of pseudo-property 
rights and other rules. For a time, this gave the broadcast industry the 
means to control the development of the cable industry.172 
While initially hesitant,173 the FCC began asserting jurisdiction in 
1962.174 By 1966, in its Second Report and Order,175 the FCC had come 
 
165. See Int’l News Serv., 248 U.S. at 245-46. 
166. Cable Vision, Inc. v. KUTV Inc., 335 F.2d 348, 350 (9th Cir. 1964). 
167. Id. 
168. 376 U.S. 225 (1964). 
169. 376 U.S. 234 (1964). 
170. 335 F.2d at 350. 
171. Id. at 351 (quoting Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234, 237 
(1964)). 
172. See infra notes 222-247. See also Stanley M. Besen & Robert W. Crandall, The 
Deregulation of Cable Television, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 1981, at 77, 81-91 
(documenting FCC activity constraining the growth of cable). 
173. See Frontier Broad. Co., 24 F.C.C. 251 (1958) (declining to exercise jurisdiction 
over cable on the ground that it was not a common carrier), reconsideration denied, 26 
F.C.C. 403, 428 (1959). 
174. The FCC assumed jurisdiction over microwave service transmitting distant TV 
signals to cable television in 1962, requiring cable systems to carry local broadcast signals as 
a condition of a microwave license to rural cable systems. See Carter Mtn. Transmission, 32 
F.C.C. 459 (1962), aff’d, 321 F.2d 359 (D.C. Cir.) (1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 951 (1963). 
175. See Amendment of Subpart L, Part 91, to Adopt Rules & Regulations to Govern 
the Grant of Authorizations in the Bus. Radio Serv. for Microwave Stations to Relay 
Television Signals to Cmty. Antenna Sys., Second Report and Order, 2 F.C.C.2d 725 (1966) 
[hereinafter Second Report and Order]. 
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to agree with the broadcasters’ substantive arguments and to associate 
harm with cable’s existence.176 By 1966, broadcasters had persuaded 
the FCC to enact a full regime of cable regulation that effectively 
conferred property rights upon broadcasters’ asserted interests. The 
FCC rules barred duplication of local broadcasting (non-duplication 
rules),177 forced cable systems to carry local signals (must-carry 
rules),178 and barred cable operators from importing signals into any of 
the top 100 television markets unless the cable operator could obtain a 
waiver by obtaining the consent of local broadcast stations.179 These 
“unbelievable”180 rules, articulated by the FCC as a defense of 
localism, provided the broadcast industry with effective governmental 
protection from its nascent cable rival. They were the high-water mark 
of late 1960s FCC interventionism, aptly characterized as the 
Commission’s own Vietnam. 
In retrospect, the experiment with the waiver regime was 
something of a dry run for a full copyright regime. The results were 
not promising. A 1976 study found that during the period from 1968 to 
1972, broadcasters agreed to a waiver allowing import in only one 
instance.181 While it may be that the regime was not given enough time 
to work, the more likely explanation is that the broadcast industry 
tried to starve its rival.182 It hints at some of the dangers of copyright as 
between rival disseminators, particular in early stages. 
Broadcasters’ third line of attack was a copyright litigation 
campaign. In 1968, the inevitable question of cable’s copyright liability 
reached the Supreme Court in Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists 
Television, Inc.183 The case was factually simple. A West Virginia cable 
operator had retransmitted various broadcasted programs to its 
customers. The broadcast industry, through copyright owners, argued 
that the cable industry’s retransmission amounted to an unauthorized 
public performance under the Copyright Act.184 
 
176. See id. at 774-78 (attempting to limit growth of cable). 
177. See id. at 746. 
178. See id. 
179. See id. at 782. 
180. Fred H. Cate, The Future of Communications Policy Making, 3 WM. & MARY BILL 
RTS. J. 1, 3 (1994). 
181. See Michael Botein, The New Copyright Act and Cable Television — A Signal of 
Change, 24 BULL. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 1, 4 (1976) (“[C]able operators somehow never 
were able to get consent.”). 
182. Niels B. Schaumann, Note, Copyright Protection in the Cable Television Industry: 
Satellite Retransmission and the Passive Carrier Exemption, 51 FORDHAM L. REV. 637, 648 
n.105 (1982) (speculating as to the reasons for the failure). 
183. 392 U.S. 390 (1968). 
184. See id. at 395. 
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But the Court disagreed, ruling that cable television was the 
functional equivalent of a more powerful antenna and that it was no 
more of a performer than an antenna manufacturer would be.185 As in 
White-Smith, not all of the Court’s reasoning was apparent in the 
decision. The court held that the cable operators were part of the 
audience for broadcast, and hence were not “performing” the work.186 
Yet it was clear that the cable operators were making money using 
copyrighted content — what had happened to the Herbert principle? 
What about Justice Holmes’ point that “the purpose of employing it is 
profit, and that is enough”? Moreover, in 1931 the Court had decided 
a factually similar radio case in the opposite manner, holding that a 
hotel that rebroadcast radio stations into private rooms without 
permission was infringing copyright.187 Something else was clearly 
afoot. Did the Court actually believe that its decision served the 
interests of copyright holders? Was the Court deferring to the FCC, or 
practicing its own communications policy? 
We can only get our clues from the dissent.188 Justice Fortas 
presented the policy considerations squarely, and in the language of 
communications policy, not copyright law: “it is darkly predicted that 
the imposition of full liability upon all CATV operations could result 
in the demise of this new, important instrument of mass 
communications . . . .”189 “On the other hand,” Justice Fortas noted, “it 
is foreseen that a decision to the effect that CATV systems never 
infringe the copyrights of the programs they carry would permit such 
systems to overpower local broadcasting stations . . . .”190 The case, as 
he saw it, was almost pure communications policy, pitting the interests 
of a new telecommunications medium against a national policy of 
localism. Fortas believed the Court should act to “do as little damage 
as possible to traditional copyright principles and to business 
relationships,” but also favored a legislative solution to “relieve[] the 
embarrassment which [the Court] and the interested parties face.”191 
The seeds of a future copyright settlement are evident from the 
Fortnightly litigation. Solicitor General Erwin Griswold suggested in 
his amicus brief on the merits that the Supreme Court could 
 
185. See id. at 399. 
186. See id. 400-01. 
187. See Buck v. Jewell LaSalle Realty Co., 283 U.S. 191, 198-99 (1931) (holding that 
playing copyrighted musical compositions broadcast from radio station via hotel 
loudspeakers is infringing performance). 
188. 392 U.S. at 402-8 (Fortas, J., dissenting). 
189. Id. at 403 (Fortas, J., dissenting). Justice Fortas would have found cable operators 
liable under the authority of Buck v. Jewell-LaSalle Realty Corp., 283 U.S. 191 (1931). 
190. Id. at 403. 
191. Id. at 404. 
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reasonably impose a copyright settlement in its decision.192 He asked 
the Court to find cable broadcasters liable, but to imply a license in 
areas where broadcast signals were weak. The Solicitor General was, 
in effect, inviting the Supreme Court to write communications 
regulation into its interpretation of the copyright statute. While both 
majority and dissent declined the invitation to settle the dispute in this 
manner, it foreshadowed a copyright settlement. 
Where the Court would not go, the FCC would. In the aftermath 
of Fortnightly, the FCC proposed granting broadcasters rights even 
more similar to copyright than the existing regime did, as if to 
compensate for their loss. In 1968 the FCC proposed the introduction 
of importation consent.193 As the name suggests, this rule would 
require cable operators to obtain the consent of the originating 
broadcaster before importing any program into a top 100 market.194 
But Congress was more interested in a copyright solution, and the 
proposal was never enacted.195 
c. Settlement & copyright. In 1970, it appeared that the predicted 
rise of cable technology was slowed, if not frozen. A law review article 
appearing that year declared that “[a]lthough cable television offers 
the potential of greatly increased television diversity, its possibilities 
have been left largely unrealized.”196 While cable had grown to reach 
about 6% of households, with approximately 4.5 million subscribers,197 
its challenge to broadcast was halted at the urban border. As 
economists Stanley Besen and Robert Crandall explained matters, 
“[c]able entered the 1970s as a small business relegated principally to 
rural areas and small communities and held hostage by television 
broadcasters to the [FCC’s] hope for the development of UHF.”198 
By the end of the decade, however, cable had been released from 
its figurative prison. Through a decade-long process of compromise, 
negotiation, FCC rulemaking and congressional legislation, a truce of 
sorts was reached. Most of the FCC’s pseudo-property rights idea and 
other restrictions were abandoned199 and what emerged was a system 
 
192. See id. at 401 n.32. 
193. See Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and Notice of Inquiry, 15 F.C.C.2d 417, 432 
(1968). 
194. See id. at 459. 
195. In re Commission Proposals for Regulation of Cable Television, 31 F.C.C.2d 115, 
115-17 (1971) (letter from the FCC to Senate Communications Subcommittee). 
196. Leonard Chazen & Leonard Ross, Federal Regulation of Cable Television: The 
Visible Hand, 83 HARV. L. REV. 1820, 1820 (1970). 
197. Television Digest, 51 TELEVISION & CABLE FACTBOOK 1, 1560 (1983). 
198. Besen & Crandall, supra note 172, at 93. 
199. That they were abandoned did not prevent their subsequent reintroduction. The 
Federal Communications Commission in the 1980s and Congress in 1992 reintroduced 
various forms of protection for the broadcast industry. See, e.g., Cable Television Consumer 
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centered on a copyright liability regime.200 While by no means an 
aesthetic exercise, that period’s history illustrates the role the 
copyright regime played in one of the most bitter technological 
succession wars of the century. 
By 1970, broadcasters had successfully convinced the FCC to 
impose serious limits on the growth of cable.201 So why would 
broadcasters even want to turn to a copyright compromise, given that 
it might jeopardize a favorable status quo? 
Primarily, a copyright solution appeared more durable. The 
restrictive regime created by the FCC was in a state of constant flux 
and was easier to change than copyright legislation. New 
commissioners at the FCC could (and ultimately did) agree with the 
positions of cable television, jeopardizing broadcasters’ favorable 
position. In particular, mounting evidence suggested that the danger of 
cable systems to television (as opposed to broadcasters) was 
exaggerated.202 This suggests that broadcasters may have felt pressure 
to convert their temporary regulatory advantage into a more lasting 
source of revenue. 
For broadcasters, this problem was compounded by the growing 
power of the cable industry. Despite the limitations on growth in 
urban areas, cable continued to grow in rural and small markets, 
trebling in size between 1966 and 1970.203 The growing power of the 
cable industry suggested that broadcasters’ ability to influence the 
regulatory and legislative process might erode over time, making a 
more durable compromise attractive. 
Finally, in the late 1960s, many broadcasters began investing in 
cable systems. By 1966, broadcasters had some stake in 30 percent of 
cable companies.204 With interests on both sides, broadcasters wanted 
a solution that would allow cable to grow in exchange for payoffs to 
the broadcasting industry, a purpose better served by a copyright 
royalty system than FCC regulations. 
Yet none of this meant that broadcasters were interested in an 
immediate copyright settlement. They still had a chance of achieving 
 
Protection and Competition Act of 1992, 47 U.S.C.A. § 521 (2004) (enacting retransmission 
consent); Amendment of Parts 73 and 76 of the Commission’s Rules Relating to Program 
Exclusivity in the Cable and Broadcast Industries, 3 F.C.C.R. 5299, 5300 (1988) (report and 
order) (syndication rules) 
200. This regime was the compulsory licensing system of § 111 of the 1976 Copyright 
Act. 17 U.S.C. § 111 (2000). 
201. Primarily through the provisions in the Second Report and Order, supra note 175. 
202. See Besen & Crandall, supra note 172, at 97. 
203. Viewership rose from about 1.5 million viewers to 4.5 million. See Television 
Digest, supra note 197. 
204. See PATRICK R. PARSONS & ROBERT M. FRIEDEN, THE CABLE AND SATELLITE 
TELEVISION INDUSTRIES 47 (1998). 
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total victory: namely, a Supreme Court decision finding cable 
retransmission illegal without permission. It was not until the Supreme 
Court played its final hand in 1974205 that settlement became 
imminent. 
An early blueprint of the cable-broadcast settlement was the 
“Compromise Agreement of 1971,”206 representing an agreement 
between major cable, broadcasting, and programming interests. The 
basic outlines of the compromise were as follows: cable, for the first 
time, would agree to some system of copyright liability, in exchange 
for a general loosening of FCC restrictions on entry into urban 
markets and other concessions to public service.207 While the 
consensus did not last, in the end the agreement was the starting point 
for a near-total deregulation of cable systems in exchange for 
copyright liability. 
The compromise, brokered in part by new FCC chairman Dean 
Baruch, began to be implemented on the regulatory side with new 
FCC rules that allowed cable systems limited importation rights in the 
top 100 markets.208 The 1972 rules, described as “among the most 
complex rules and regulations ever devised by the mind of man,” 
began a gradual process of FCC deregulation of the cable industry.209 
The copyright side of the deal took four more years to settle 
through the legislative process. While the major industry associations 
remained committed to the agreement, many members of the cable 
industry sought to defect. For example, representatives of 
Teleprompter Corp., one of the nation’s largest cable systems, 
appeared before Congress to demand continued immunity from 
copyright, claiming that the consensus agreement was “pushed down 
 
205. See infra text accompanying note 234. 
206. The consensus agreement is described in U.S. Cong. House Comm. on the Judiciary 
Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties and the Administration of Justice Hearings, 92d Cong. 
(1972), in 14 OMNIBUS COPYRIGHT REVISION LEGIS. HIST. 502 (George S. Grossman ed., 
1976) (statement of Rex A. Bradley). 
207. See Cable Television Report and Order, 36 F.C.C.2d 143 (1972). As described by 
the chairman of the National Cable and Telecommunications Association, “in 1971, in an 
effort to break the regulatory impasse over cable, the Office of Telecommunications Policy 
and the FCC fashioned the so called ‘Consensus Agreement’ under which the parties — 
broadcasters, copyright owners, and cable — affirmed support for copyright legislation and 
approved the outline for new FCC cable regulations.” U.S. Cong. House Comm. on the 
Judiciary Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties and the Admin. of Justice Hearings (Part 1), 
supra note 204, at 502.. 
208. See Cable Television Report and Order, 36 F.C.C.2d at 241. The new rules allowed 
cable systems to import sufficient signals to offer 3 network plus 3 independent signals in 
markets 1-50, 3 network plus 2 independents in markets 51-100, and 3 networks plus 1 
independent outside the top 100 markets. See id. The rules also required a minimum 20 
channel capacity. See Cable Television Report and Order, 36 F.C.C.2d at paras. 57-77. 
209. See generally Besen & Crandall, supra note 172, at 93-103. 
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the throat of the cable television industry.”210 Teleprompter and other 
cable operators returned to the position that cable systems were 
nothing but another form of antenna: “[W]hy should there be any 
liability when the viewer avails himself of the antenna tower erected 
by the cable television station?”211 
On the other side, broadcasters made a final effort to obtain full 
copyright liability with the Teleprompter litigation.212 Teleprompter, 
unlike Fortnightly, was a signal importation case. Columbia 
Broadcasting Systems could point to Teleprompter’s imports, some 
from distances as far as 450 miles,213 and make the audience 
fragmentation argument described above. Yet the Supreme Court 
proved uninterested in undoing the line drawn in the Fortnightly 
decision. “‘Broadcasters perform. Viewers [including cable] do not 
perform.’”214 With that, broadcasters exhausted their last chance at 
obtaining full victory — total copyright liability. 
Congress enacted the copyright side of the compromise in 1976. 
The form was a compulsory licensing law, codified in section 111 of 
the 1976 Act.215 As a settlement, on the one hand it allowed the cable 
systems to continue their basic means of doing business: 
retransmission of broadcast programs. Yet in exchange, cable systems 
agreed to pay royalties on imported signals,216 not to alter the content 
or advertising of the signals it retransmitted,217 and to retransmit 
programs simultaneously with the broadcast.218 In short, the licensing 
scheme mapped the existing business practices of cable companies, 
and added transfer payments to it. The extent of these payments was 
to be determined by a new statutory creation, the Copyright Royalty 
Tribunal.219 
 
210. U.S. Cong. House Comm. on the Judiciary Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties and 
the Administration of Justice Hearings (Part 1), 94th Cong. (1975), in 14 OMNIBUS 
COPYRIGHT REVISION LEGIS. HIST. 671 (George S. Grossman ed., 1977) (statement of 
William J. Bresnan). 
211. U.S. Cong. House Comm. on the Judiciary Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties and 
the Administration of Justice Hearings (Part 1), supra note 210, at 667 (statement of William 
J. Bresnan). 
212. Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 415 U.S. 394 (1974). 
213. Id. at 400. 
214. Id. at 403 (quoting Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, 392 U.S. 390, 398 
(1968)). 
215. 17 U.S.C. § 111(c)(1) (2000). 
216. Id. 
217. 17 U.S.C. § 111(c)(3). 
218. 17 U.S.C. § 111(c)(1), (f) (2000). 
219. 17 U.S.C. §§ 801-810 (1976). The Tribunal was abolished in 1993 and its functions 
transferred to the Copyright Office and the Librarian of Congress. See Copyright Royalty 
Tribunal Reform Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-198, 107 Stat. 2304 (1993) (codified at 17 
U.S.C. §§ 801-03 (2000)). 
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In the last stage of the 1970s settlement, the FCC repealed most of 
the remaining regulation of the cable industry. By January 1, 1978, as 
the copyright system came into force, the core remaining limitations of 
the old regime were the “distant-signal” limitations, which limited the 
import of programming into large (top 100) television markets,220 and 
the syndicated exclusivity rules, which allowed local stations in urban 
areas to force cable to black out programs for which they had 
purchased exclusive exhibition rights.221 Together, these two rules 
continued to limit cable’s exploitation of urban markets. But in 1980, 
the FCC repealed these last regulations.222 It concluded that the 
absence of evidence of economic harm and the new copyright scheme 
had eliminated any need for its copyright “surrogates.”223 With this 
decision, the replacement of prohibitive FCC regulations with 
copyright liability was essentially complete.224 
Freed from regulatory limits, cable subscription exploded, 
quadrupling from 1975 to 1985. The 3,506 systems serving nearly ten 
million subscribers became, by 1985, 6,600 systems serving nearly forty 
million Americans.225 It had taken thirty years and much regulatory 
warfare, but cable completed its succession of broadcast and assumed 
its place as the dominant technology of television. 
d. Epilogue. As telecommunications historians know, the 1970s did 
not entirely end the regulatory battles between cable and 
broadcasting. The Copyright Royalty Tribunal, for example, attracted 
enormous litigation in its setting of fees.226 There emerged in the 1980s 
a movement (backed by broadcasters) to tame the power of cable, 
culminating in Congress reinstating some of the regulations that the 
FCC had dropped in the late 1970s. For example, in 1992 Congress 
adopted the retransmission consent rule first proposed by the FCC in 
 
220. FCC Cable Television Service, 47 C.F.R. §§ 76.59(b)-(e), 76.61(b)-(f), 76.63 (1980). 
221. 47 C.F.R. §§ 76.151-61. 
222. See Cable Television Syndicated Program Exclusivity Rules, 79 F.C.C.2d 663 
(1980), aff’d sub nom, Malrite T.V. of N.Y. v. FCC, 652 F.2d 1140 (2d Cir. 1981). 
223. Inquiry into the Economic Relationship between Television Broadcasting & Cable 
Television, 71 F.C.C.2d 632 (1979). 
224. Only the network non-duplication and must-carry rules remained in place. See 
Cable Television Syndicated Program Exclusivity Rules, 79 F.C.C.2d 663 (1980), aff’d sub 
nom, Malrite T.V. of N.Y. v. FCC, 652 F.2d 1140 (2d Cir. 1981). 
225. See PARSONS & FRIEDEN, supra note 204, at 57-60 (detailing the cable “explosion” 
of the 1980s); see also Sharon Strover, United States: Cable Television, at http://www. 
museum.tv/archives/etv/U/htmlU/unitedstatesc/unitedstatesc.htm (detailing facts of cable’s 
growth). 
226. See Register of Copyright, Compulsory Licensing in the Television Industry (1990). 
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1968, giving broadcasters, for the first time, a clear property right in 
their signals.227 
Yet at this stage these conflicts were between mature industries, 
not incumbent and challenger. The example of the 1992 
retransmission consent rules shows the difference. Had the courts 
granted broadcasters such rights in 1961 (as common-law unfair 
competition rights), the rights would have put cable development in 
the control of broadcasters.228 In 1992, things were much different. 
Congress described the cable industry not as a pirate, but as “a 
dominant nationwide video medium.”229 And when confronted with 
demands for further payment, the cable networks asserted their power 
and struck a not unfavorable deal.230 Cable’s stance made it clear that 
broadcast was now dependent on cable, and not vice versa. Their roles 
had reversed. 
E. The Classic Communications Regime Arrives 
The birth of the recording industry, radio broadcast, and cable 
created a pattern for setting copyright’s communications policy. The 
classic regime, as I have described its operation from 1900 to 1976, is 
centered on the model of access fees, or compulsory licenses. New 
technologies capable of delivering copyrighted content will be granted 
access to the copyrighted works essential to their business, but for a 
price. This basic approach was followed in several subsequent matters, 
including satellite television in the 1980s231 and radio webcasting in the 
1990s.232 The classic regime is therefore something of a default for 
 
227. See Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Pub. L. 
No. 102-385, § 2(a)(2)-(5), 106 Stat. 1460, 1460-61 (detailing the increase in cable 
viewership). 
228. For a description of efforts to obtain a common law right in signal, see supra text 
accompanying notes 163-170. 
229. Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act § 2(a)(3). 
230. See Charles Lubinsky, Reconsidering Retransmission Consent: An Examination of 
the Retransmission Consent Provision (47 U.S.C. § 325(b)) of the 1992 Cable Act, 49 FED. 
COMM. L.J. 99, 144-49 (1996) (noting that instead of cash, most broadcasters exchanged their 
retransmission consent for cable’s agreement to carry additional channels); Christopher S. 
Yoo, Rethinking the Commitment to Free, Local Television, 52 EMORY L.J. 1579, 1658-59 
(2003) (same). 
231. The Satellite Home Viewer Act of 1988 created a compulsory license for satellite 
broadcasting similar in structure to the cable compulsory license. Satellite Home Viewer Act 
of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-667, 102 Stat. 3949 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 
U.S.C.). 
232. Webcasters pay royalties for sound recordings according to a complicated scheme 
first made law in the Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act of 1995, Pub. L. 
No. 104-39, 109 Stat. 336 (1995). For an overview of the political process that led to the 
compulsory license, see Kimberly L. Craft, The Webcasting Music Revolution Is Ready to 
Begin, as Soon as We Figure Out the Copyright Law: The Story of the Music Industry at War 
with Itself, 24 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 1 (2001). 
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industries that do not fit the model of exemptions, which are the 
“new” copyright communications regime described in Part III. 
For copyright theorists, the historical evolution of the classic 
regime holds important lessons. However pure and true copyright’s 
goals of promoting authorship may be, the law will inevitably be used 
by communications companies as an instrument of competitive 
advantage. Copyright cannot help creating the baseline for 
competition among disseminators. It creates communications policy 
not by design but by necessity. 
II. POLICY 
I have suggested that copyright has evolved to regulate 
competition among rivals, that it in effect comprises independent 
authorship and communications regimes, and that within the 
communications regime has evolved a standing institutional practice 
of using copyright to settle near-inevitable conflicts among rival 
disseminators. These are descriptive claims. The second part addresses 
the obvious policy questions that arise from study of copyright’s 
communications regime. 
A. Bottlenecks and Vertical Foreclosure 
The economic analysis of authorship revolves around the 
nonrivalrous nature of information goods and the problems thereby 
created. Copyright’s role in communications policy, conversely, is 
more readily analyzed as the “bottleneck” problem deriving from 
copyright’s grant of control over an asset essential to market entry 
(namely, copyrighted works), and the potential created for vertical 
foreclosure of rivals. In this effort, it should be noted at the outset that 
the goal of this section is to outline the argument as it appears in 
telecommunications policy, and not conclusively defend the premise 
that vertical foreclosure is problematic.233 
To understand the model we must consider the conditions of 
competition that face rival disseminators regulated by copyright. 
 
233. That debate is addressed by a rich literature on vertical foreclosure. In general, see 
Louis Kaplow, Extension of Monopoly Power Through Leverage, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 515 
(1985); Janusz A. Ordover et al., Equilibrium Vertical Foreclosure, 80 AM. ECON. REV. 
127 (1990); and Michael A. Salinger, Vertical Mergers and Market Foreclosure, 103 Q.J. 
ECON. 345 (1988). With regard to telecommunications policy in particular, see Paul L. 
Joskow & Roger G. Noll, The Bell Doctrine: Applications In Telecommunications, 
Electricity, and Other Network Industries, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1249 (1999), and Alexander 
Larson et al., Competitive Access Issues and Telecommunications Regulatory Policy, 20 J. 
CONTEMP. L. 419 (1994). For an excellent overview of the economic arguments regarding 
vertical integration and their relevance for communications policy, see Joseph Farrell & 
Philip J. Weiser, Modularity, Vertical Integration, and Open Access Policies: Towards a 
Convergence of Antitrust and Regulation in the Internet Age, 17 HARV. L. & TECH. 85 (2003). 
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Consider a disseminator to be anyone who owns a legally protected 
means of communication with a customer: 
FIGURE 3.1: COMMUNICATIONS MODEL 
 
In the field of communications, the legally protected link pictured 
here can take many forms. It can be physical, protected by the rules of 
personal property: copper loops between the telephone company and 
the consumer, the cable infrastructure, and so on. But the link can also 
be a legal entitlement that does not reference any particular physical 
infrastructure, such as the allocation of a certain spectrum frequency 
to a broadcaster to reach its customers.234 From this arises a central 
and recurring policy question: To what degree should the legal 
protection afforded that bottleneck allow the owner to exploit his 
ownership to maximum advantage? 
Two potential abuses of bottleneck power are of particular interest 
and recur in the study of communications law. The first is the simple 
problem of monopoly price-setting.235 The incumbent should be 
expected to charge a supra-competitive price if its ownership of the 
protected link makes it the only entity in a position to provide the 
service in question. In telecommunications law this problem has 
traditionally led to extensive government rate-setting, such as the 
setting of local telephone rates.236 
The second is the problem of vertical foreclosure: the use of the 
protected link to prevent a competing disseminator, or challenger, 
who depends on the link, from reaching the customer in question. The 
foreclosure is “vertical” because the incumbent uses its control over 
 
234. See 47 U.S.C. § 307 (2000) (containing procedures for federal grants of licenses to 
broadcast spectrum). 
235. INGO VOGELSANG & BRIDGER M. MITCHELL, TELECOMMUNICATIONS 
COMPETITION: THE LAST TEN MILES 55-58 (1997) (discussing the effect of bottlenecks on 
price-setting policy). 
236. See 2 HARVEY ZUCKMAN ET AL., MODERN COMMUNICATION LAW § 9.2 (1999) 
(describing various aspects of rate setting for local carriers). 
Service Provider
Consumer
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an independent input at another level (copyrighted materials) to affect 
competition at the level of dissemination.237 
FIGURE 3.2: VERTICAL FORECLOSURE VIA BOTTLENECK 
 
An illustration of the vertical foreclosure problem comes from the 
example of long distance telephone service. If the incumbent (Bell) 
owns the local telephone lines, it can potentially foreclose a long-
distance service provider (MCI) from reaching any customers, 
favoring Bell’s own long distance service. Hence a critical question for 
telecommunications law has always been determining the extent to 
which the owner of the local phone service should be required to 
provide access to local lines to vendors of long-distance telephone 
service.238 
Both problems stemming from the bottleneck are central to most 
contemporary communications policy: wireline regulation, broadband 
regulation and spectrum policy are three current examples. In each 
case the basic problem is the same. On the one hand, allowing the 
incumbent too much power to prevent challengers from reaching 
customers retards both price competition and innovation in new 
communications technologies. Yet granting too little legal protection 
to the original link might erase the incentives to build the original link 
and its technological successors. 
With some simplifying assumptions, it is not hard to see how 
copyright law can be used as a potential tool for monopoly price-
setting or vertical foreclosure, raising the same questions faced in 
communications.239 The vertical foreclosure problem is evident from 
the story of the broadcast and cable industries in the 1960s.240 Each 
possessed its own technology for reaching consumers, yet each needed 
 
237. Whether copyrighted materials are described as upstream or downstream is largely 
a semantic issue. The foreclosure is vertical in either case. 
238. See 2 HARVEY ZUCKMAN ET AL., MODERN COMMUNICATION LAW § 9.1 (1999) 
(describing the various access issues addressed by the Telecommunications Act of 1996). 
239. Cf. Picker, supra note 22. 
240. See supra Part I.D.3.b. 
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X
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access to copyrighted works in order to provide a service that 
customers would pay for. The copyrighted works were the bottleneck 
necessary to compete in the industry. Therefore, if the broadcast 
industry (the incumbent) could have enforced the copyrights in 
television content, it could have prevented the cable industry from 
reaching television customers. It could have achieved similar results to 
what the telephone industry might achieve by controlling local phone 
lines. 
FIGURE 3.3: COPYRIGHT USED FOR VERTICAL FORECLOSURE 
 
The vertical foreclosure model, however, only describes one class 
of communication problems that arises in the copyright context. The 
problems of monopoly price-setting can also occur. This has happened 
in situations where authors maintain independent control of their 
copyrights, as in the ASCAP-radio dispute described above.241 The 
communications model for the ASCAP problem is a horizontal cartel 
among the suppliers of copyrighted works (authors), leading to 
monopoly price-setting. The necessity of having access to content and 
the legal protection of copyright creates the possibility of an ASCAP 
cartel in the first place. 
FIGURE 3.4: THE DIFFERENCE THAT AUTHORIAL CONTROL MAKES 
 
 
241. See supra Part I.D.2. 
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There is an important difference between the problems created by 
the horizontal (ASCAP) and vertical (broadcast) competition 
problems. While a horizontal cartel among authors may be expected 
to raise consumer prices, it will not necessarily block market entry or 
technological innovation. For economic theories that take innovation, 
as opposed to price competition, as the primary engine of economic 
growth,242 the vertical foreclosure problem is more serious. 
All of this goes to show that copyright law’s protections can and do 
create the same competition problems regularly encountered in 
telecommunications law. None of this is to suggest that the best way of 
dealing with these problems is self-evident. Sizable disagreement 
exists over what, if any, government role is appropriate in the face of 
potential vertical foreclosure or monopoly price-setting.243 Yet over 
the years positions have hardened and it is easier to understand the 
choices available. What follows describes the policy alternatives that 
have emerged. 
B. National Communications Policy 
To understand the choices faced in copyright we must turn to the 
subject of national communications policy. There have long existed 
two basic models of the optimal communications policy: the 
“stewardship” model and “competitive” (or “open”) model.244 Both 
models have a pedigree in national communications policy, though the 
latter is dominant today. 
1. Stewardship Communications Policy 
A steward-based communications policy245 is premised on the 
grant, to private parties, of clear and uncontestable property 
entitlements in future media and technologies. The rationale for such 
grants is the premise that the private owner of such a grant will, in the 
interest of profit maximization, efficiently steward the growth of an 
 
242. See, e.g., JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY 
81-86 (3d ed. 1950). 
243. For a useful normative overview of when governmental intervention may be 
justified to prevent vertical integration, see Farrell & Weiser, supra note 233. 
244. For another description of these two models in the internet context, see Philip J. 
Weiser, The Internet, Innovation, and Intellectual Property Policy, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 534, 
568-83 (2003). 
245. Advocates will sometimes describe this as a “deregulatory” communications 
policy,.. This language is difficult to support when it is a copyright system, a form of 
regulation, that is conferring the right to block or license market entry. See Maureen Ryan, 
Cyberspace as Public Space: A Public Trust Paradigm for Copyright in a Digital World, 79 
ORE. L. REV. 647, 694-95 (2000). 
WU 2 12/22/2004 3:33:06 PM 
330 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 103:278 
 
efficient communications system and the development of new 
technologies.246 
The stewardship model has historically enjoyed many arguments in 
its favor, including support from economist Joseph Schumpeter.247 
Chief among them is the view that the dominant firm can be expected 
to internalize what would otherwise be externalities in a competitive 
scenario. For example, competitors may have incentives to free-ride 
on the research efforts of others, while a dominant incumbent has no 
such option. Similarly, a dominant incumbent may exercise quality 
control to prevent shoddy products from being used on its system.248 
The problem of natural monopoly also drives the argument for a 
steward-based communications policy. Economists have argued that 
with economies of scale and scope characterizing the production of 
telecommunications services, monopoly is the likely outcome.249 If 
monopoly is inevitable in communications markets, a policy that 
directs the monopolist to secure innovation and act in the public 
interest may seem the only recourse. 
Relatedly, a steward-based communications policy also avoids 
much arguably wasteful duplication. The dominant market player can 
avoid duplicative investments for the transmission of the same 
information to the same consumer (such as two sets of telephone lines, 
or two different printings of the same book). This is the argument for 
allowing communications infrastructures to take the form of natural 
monopolies. And pertaining to technological innovation, the dominant 
player can prevent duplicative races to reach the same invention, 
much like preventing multiple missions to pursue the same sunken 
treasure.250 
As a model of innovation, the planned view shares much with the 
“prospect theory” of patent law, which holds that control centralized 
in a pioneer industry allows a more orderly process of follow-on 
innovation.251 The costs of conflict, or “rent dissipation,” may be 
eliminated if broad, enforceable rights are granted to the pioneer 
 
246. This stewardship model is similar to the “prospect theory” of patent protection. See 
Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 265 
(1977). 
247. See JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY 100-06 
(3d ed. 1950). 
248. Cf. Douglas Lichtman, Property Rights in Emerging Platform Technologies, 29 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 615 (2000) (arguing that intellectual property law should encourage price 
coordination in emerging technology contexts). 
249. See VOGELSANG & MITCHELL, supra note 235, at 51 (describing natural monopoly 
as one justification for telecommunications regulation). 
250. Cf. POSNER, supra note 49, at 35-38 (examining rent dissipation theory by analyzing 
costs through the example of a hunt for sunken treasure). 
251. See Kitch, supra note 246. 
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industry, creating a prospect that can be explored without fear of 
competition. 
Finally, the stewardship model’s greatest appeal for many is that it 
implies a much simpler (though not necessarily reduced) 
governmental role. The government need only assign and enforce 
property rights; it need not decide whether its grants of property rights 
are improperly blocking market entry. The incumbent industry does 
so itself. 
In short, the vision of the stewardship model relies on a distrust of 
government in favor of the developmental wisdom of an incumbent 
communications industry. The model claims simplicity, efficiency and 
a limited role for the state. 
2. “Competitive” Communications Policy 
A “competitive” or “open” communications policy sacrifices the 
order, predictability and stability of a planned policy for greater 
allowance of market entry and (backers believe) faster technological 
development.252 
Competitive communications policies are premised on the belief 
that technical innovation plays a central role in economic growth, and 
that technical change is best understood as an evolutionary process. 
These ideas also claim their origin in Joseph Schumpeter’s work, but 
their roots lie in his conception that “creative destruction” is the 
source of capitalism’s benefits, not mere price competition.253 
Economists like Richard Nelson argue that technological change is by 
necessity an error-driven, evolutionary process.254 Markets select from 
a variety of competing approaches whose relative merits are otherwise 
difficult to assess in advance.255 
This view leads to distrust of the stewardship model and dominant 
firm theories. If the most promising path of development is difficult to 
predict in advance, Nelsonites argue, it is unrealistic to expect a single 
company to take the optimal path of technological development, 
however well-intentioned it may be. This problem is compounded if 
any single party can be expected to have anything less than perfect 
decisionmaking skills resulting from, for example, a predisposition to 
 
252. See Mark A. Lemley and Lawrence Lessig, The End of End-to-End: Preserving the 
Architecture of the Internet in the Broadband Era, 48 UCLA L. REV. 925, 961 (2001). 
253. See SCHUMPETER, supra note 247, at 81-86. 
254. See, e.g., RICHARD R. NELSON & SIDNEY G. WINTER, AN EVOLUTIONARY 
THEORY OF ECONOMIC CHANGE 14-21 (1982); John Ziman, Evolutionary Models for 
Technological Change, in TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION AS AN EVOLUTIONARY PROCESS 
3 (John Ziman ed., 2000). 
255. See NELSON & WINTER, supra note 254, at 15 (“[E]volutionary theory [recognizes] 
that there are stochastic [random] elements both in the determination of decisions and of 
decision outcomes.”). 
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continue with current ways of doing business.256 Along similar lines, 
legal theorists argue that vesting control over improvement in a single 
figure creates an enormous risk of stagnancy deriving from the danger 
of an incumbent industry’s disinterest in change.257 
The competitive model usually suggests a more active 
governmental role, particularly in removing barriers to market entry. 
In this model the government is pictured (ideally) as something like a 
beneficent gardener, trying to preserve conditions for innovation while 
simultaneously preventing a dominant firm from choking new growth. 
If innovation does indeed occur the way Nelsonites believe, greater 
government involvement may be necessary to prevent industrial and 
technological stagnation. 
3. The Consensus Position 
Whatever the substantive merits of these two approaches to 
communications policy, as a descriptive matter, some version of the 
competitive model has dominated national communications policy 
since the mid-1980s.258 It is true that there remains much disagreement 
on how competition is best promoted and, in particular, how intrusive 
a role government should play. Yet the FCC and Congress now 
uniformly adhere to the model of competitive innovation. 
Things were not always tipped in favor of the competitive model. 
The balance of twentieth century communications policy was driven, 
instead, by a stewardship model, a model most clearly apparent in the 
Bell System’s stewardship of the national telephone system. The Bell 
Company is the definitive model of the regulated monopolist asked to 
implement the public policy aspirations of national communications 
policy.259 Yet from the late 1960s onward, the courts, the FCC and 
finally Congress began a slow migration to the now-dominant 
competitive communications model. Glen Robinson describes the 
thirty-year shift as “one of the stunning achievements of modern 
public policy, the transformation of a staid and stagnant industry into 
the most dynamic and rapidly growing industry in the modern 
 
256. See NELSON & WINTER, supra note 254, at 72-95 (discussing the concept of 
organizational “skills”). 
257. See, e.g., Robert P. Merges and Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of 
Patent Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 839, 890-94 (1990) (criticizing the stewardship model in the 
patent context). This is also an animating principle of Lawrence Lessig’s work, particularly 
The Future of Ideas. See LESSIG, supra note 1. 
258. See, e.g., GERALD W. BROCK, TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY FOR THE 
INFORMATION AGE (1994); Glen O. Robinson, The Titanic Remembered: AT&T and the 
Changing World of Telecommunications, 5 YALE J. ON REG. 517, 520-31 (1988) (recounting 
the history of telecommunications policy). 
259. See Robinson, supra note 258, at 517 (describing the Bell System). 
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economy.”260 As he argues, it “did not come about through technology 
alone; it came about by rethinking notions about natural monopoly, 
[and] economies of scale and scope — concepts near and dear to the 
ancient regime.”261 
There are many legal milestones in the policy migration. The most 
notable and dramatic was the 1984 breakup of the AT&T monopoly 
by federal judge Harold Green.262 But the clearest legislative 
manifestation of this policy shift is the 1996 Telecom Act,263 the central 
statute of communications law. As the FCC explains, the law was 
meant “to let any communications business compete in any market 
against any other.”264 While the Act is far too complicated to 
summarize, its most important and best-known change is the 
authorization of open competition in both local and long-distance 
telephone services.265 These changes are a sharp break from previous 
policies, which still adhered to the Bell model. And while assessments 
of the success of 1996 Act’s promotion of competition are mixed,266 its 
policy is clear. 
Stated adherence to the competitive model of communications 
policy is now de rigueur for the FCC. Across every area of stated 
policy, the FCC states goals that could have been drafted by Richard 
Nelson. The competitive goal of the FCC is to “support the Nation’s 
economy by ensuring that there is a comprehensive and sound 
competitive framework for communications services . . . foster[ing] 
innovation and offer[ing] consumers meaningful choice in services.” In 
the contentious area of broadband, the FCC aims to “establish 
regulatory policies that promote competition, innovation, and 
investment in broadband service.” Or as Commission Chairman 
 
260. Glen O. Robinson, The “New” Communications Act: A Second Opinion, 29 CONN. 
L. REV. 289, 304 (1996). 
261. Id. (emphasis omitted). 
262. The breakup of AT&T is recounted in detail in GERALD R. FAULHABER 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS IN TURMOIL: TECHNOLOGY AND PUBLIC POLICY (1988). 
263. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996) (codified as 
amended in scattered portions of 47 U.S.C.). 
264. See Federal Communications Commission, Telecommunications Act of 1996, at 
http://www.fcc.gov/telecom.html (updated Mar. 29, 2004). 
265. See 47 U.S.C. § 251 (2000). 
266. The Act’s effort to create more local telephone competition is widely described as a 
“failure.” See, e.g., Reza Dibadj, Competive Debacle in Local Telephony: Is the 1996 Telecom 
Act to Blame?, 81 WASH. U. L. 1, 2-6 (2003) (summarizing academic, judicial, and public 
critiques of the 1996 Telecom Act). However, it is credited by some for opening up the 
market for telecommunications services more generally. See, e.g., Corey Grice, How the 
Telecom Act created a new breed of speed, CNET News, at http://news.com.com/2009-
1033_3-251796.html (Feb. 1, 2001) (last visited Sept. 30, 2004) (arguing that the 1996 Act set 
off the expansion and development of broadband internet access). 
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Michael Powell puts it, the FCC must do what is necessary to foster 
“competitive innovation.”267 
Much of this, of course, is at a certain level of abstraction, and 
there is much debate over what policies will, in fact, facilitate 
competitive innovation in the communications industry. But in the 
areas of communications law outside of copyright law, the existence of 
a basic consensus is notable. The starting point for debate is the view 
that open communications competition drives innovation and 
economic growth. The question is what role copyright law plays in that 
vision. 
C. Copyright’s Classic Communications Policy 
How can copyright’s classic communications policy best be 
described in terms of the models described here? Copyright’s record 
is, of course, complicated and inconsistent. There are also too few 
examples to come to a definite conclusion. Yet it is notable that, when 
faced with the potential problem of vertical foreclosure — copyright 
creating bars to market entry by disseminators — copyright’s rules 
have often bent to prevent an incumbent from using copyright to 
control a technological challenger. Stated differently, the courts and 
Congress have in practice avoided a stewardship model of 
communications and delivered results closer to a competitive model of 
communications policy. 
As the history explained above demonstrates, when faced with 
potential lockout, the copyright system avoided granting incumbent 
disseminators full control over a technologically advanced rival (the 
same also holds for cases not recounted above).268 Instead, both 
incumbent and challenger were forced to put their case to the 
government and to invest in efforts to steer policy in their favored 
direction. 
Obviously things could have been different. With just a few 
decisions the Supreme Court could have easily steered the law toward 
the stewardship model, trusting the incumbent to direct the 
subsequent development of cable, the recording industry, or the 
photocopier. As Jane Ginsburg has argued, many of the pro-
challenger Supreme Court decisions, from White-Smith to Fortnightly, 
can be impossible to understand without some idea that the Court 
 
267. Michael K. Powell, Remarks at the Silicon Flatirons Symposium on “The Digital 
Broadband Migration: Toward a Regulatory Regime for the Internet Age” at the University 
of Colorado School of Law (Feb. 8, 2004). 
268. The other major example is that of the photocopier, which was exempted from 
copyright protection in Williams & Wilkins Co. v. U.S., 487 F.2d 1345 (Ct. Cl. 1973), aff’d, 
420 U.S. 376 (1975) (constituting an equally divided Supreme Court). For a wonderful 
account of the photocopier saga, see GOLDSTEIN, supra note 20. 
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feared that the incumbent wanted copyright for the wrong reasons.269 
Similarly, the most common statutory form of settlement, the 
compulsory license, is a liability scheme that prevents market lockout 
while compensating the incumbent. Such a scheme, as discussed 
above, is inconsistent with a steward model of communications policy. 
Even though the classic communications regime mainly reflected 
an open model of communications policy, it must be admitted that no 
self-conscious reasoning can be found to that effect in the caselaw or 
in other sources. The main communications cases, like Teleprompter, 
are almost entirely free of any policy-based explanations for the 
courts’ decisions. 
D. Understanding the Critiques of the Classic Communications 
Regime 
With this framework of analysis in mind, we are in a better 
position to understand the criticism of what I have termed copyright’s 
classic communications regime. The practice from 1900-1976 has never 
been terribly popular. Both contemporary and present copyright 
commentators have attacked its operation for a range of reasons — 
most of which, I argue, miss the point. While there are reasons to 
disfavor the competitive model of communications policy, it seems 
rare that critics of the process actually refer to them. 
As early as 1903 the Copyright Office began to argue that a revised 
copyright statute should be flexible enough to deal with new 
technologies as they arose. The Office argued in its report that 
copyright “ought to be dealt with as a whole, and not by further 
merely partial or temporizing amendments.”270 It stated that the “acts 
now in force should be replaced by one consistent statute, of simple 
and direct phraseology.”271 With greater force and effect in 1961, the 
Office argued for a copyright law that would be “broad enough to 
include not only those forms in which copyrightable works are now 
being produced, but also new forms which are invented or come into 
use later.”272 These are very common arguments. Many copyright 
thinkers argue that the 1909 Act and other early acts were too clumsy, 
 
269. See Ginsburg, supra note 20, at 1617 (“[W]hen copyright owners seek to eliminate a 
new kind of dissemination, and when courts do not deem that dissemination harmful to 
copyright owners, courts decline to find infringement, even though the legal and economic 
analyses that support those determinations often seem strained, not to say disingenuous.” 
(emphasis in original)). 
270. See Thorvald Solberg, Copyright Law Reform, 35 YALE L. J. 48, 62 (1925) 
(reprinting Report on Copyright Legislation, Dec. 1, 1903). 
271. Id. 
272. Staff of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 87th Cong., Report of the Register of 
Copyrights on the General Revision of the U.S. Copyright Law 11 (Comm. Print 1961). 
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requiring amendment or difficult judicial interpretation for each new 
technology. 
It is true that the pre-1976 Acts produced uncertainty as to the 
rights of a copyright owner. But such uncertainty can also advance a 
communications policy that favors new entry. A simpler law can 
nonetheless be a bad law; the value of clarity must be weighed against 
such larger concerns. It might be said that the problem with statutory 
ambiguity is that it has encouraged parties to invest in efforts to gain 
favorable government action. That is true, but it is also true that 
forcing parties to come to the government could have forced both 
sides to present information that may have led to better and earlier 
settlements.273 
Some academics have criticized the classic model’s tendency 
toward compulsory licensing on different economic grounds. Robert 
Merges has argued that enforcing property entitlements is more likely 
to promote the private bargaining necessary for creation of “collective 
rights organizations,” such as the ASCAP.274 The value of collective 
rights organizations, according to Merges, is that they are better than 
compulsory licensing schemes for reducing the transaction costs of 
licensing a diverse mixture of copyrights. Merges argues that 
policymakers should in all cases “stay away from compulsory licensing 
for new media!”275 
Merges, in collaboration with Richard Nelson, has criticized the 
stewardship model of innovation in the patent context276; his position 
with respect to copyright can be tested against his own arguments. 
Merges takes the purpose of compulsory licensing schemes to be the 
reduction of transaction costs — he does not account for the role a 
liability regime might play in market entry of new technologies. The 
earlier Merges teaches that intellectual property’s “social costs should 
include its potential to reduce competition in the market for 
improvements” and “there are many instances when a firm that 
thought it had control over a broad technology rested on its laurels 
until jogged to action by an outside threat.”277 If this is so with respect 
to patent holders, why don’t the same considerations suggest scrutiny 
of copyright? In addition, Merges relies on the ASCAP as an 
alternative model to compulsory licensing, but the analogy is 
inapposite, for several reasons. 
 
273. Cf. Ian Ayres & Eric Talley, Solomonic Bargaining: Dividing a Legal Entitlement to 
Facilitate Coasean Trade, 104 YALE L.J. 1027, 1036-72 (1995). 
274. See Robert Merges, Contracting into Liability Rules: Intellectual Property Rights 
and Collective Rights Organizations, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1293 (1996). 
275. See id. at 1300. 
276. See Merges & Nelson, supra note 257. 
277. Id. at 843, 872. 
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The ASCAP is a coalition of authors. As a model it is therefore no 
answer for the problems created when rival disseminators use 
copyright against another rival. As long as the disseminator in a given 
industry has effective control or actual ownership of copyright 
necessary to its business model, the ASCAP model is not a viable 
alternative. The compulsory licensing regimes that Merges opposes 
are (as Section II.A points out), solutions to a different problem: 
vertical foreclosure of one disseminator by another. The ASCAP 
model is only viable where authors have sufficiently independent 
power and control over their own copyrights. As for the subject of 
pricing, the fact that the ASCAP’s independent pricing scheme was set 
in the shadow of an antitrust decree278 renders questionable the 
argument that the ASCAP’s pricing is fully independent of 
government supervision. 
A final argument against the compulsory licensing model rests on 
the proposition that broad property entitlements are attractive 
because they will speed technological development. As Peter Huber, 
John Thorne and Michael Kellog state this argument in their 1995 
treatise, granting broadcasters immediate rights over cable would have 
hastened its development: 
It is interesting to speculate how differently things might have developed 
if the Supreme Court had affirmed both cable’s copyright obligations and 
its First Amendment rights simply and clearly at the outset . . . . Without 
a right to pull signals at will from the air, cable might have started up 
more slowly, but it would probably then have grown more quickly.279 
Huber and his compatriots are proposing the stewardship model of 
communications policy. Their belief is that simple, clear and broad 
entitlements, unfettered by any regulation, will lead to the optimal 
deployment and development of communication technologies. 
As discussed in Section II.B, the wisdom of such an approach must 
take into account the objections stemming from evolutionary theories 
of innovation. This point can be expressed in terms of the bottleneck 
problem described in Part II.A. For any form of expressive work (such 
as video, book, or music) there exist several potential technologies of 
dissemination. Yet not every method of dissemination is invented at 
the same time, and indeed many cannot be predicted ex ante. For 
example, the pioneering system of mass television dissemination was 
terrestrial broadcast — rabbit-ear antennas and tall towers. In time 
various successive technologies of mass video dissemination were 
developed and reduced to practice, including wire (cable television), 
satellite, and most recently, streaming applications on the Internet. 
 
278. See United States v. Am. Soc’y of Composers, Authors & Publishers, 1950 Trade 
Cas. (CCH) ¶ 62,595 at 63,751 (S.D.N.Y. 1950). 
279. See JOHN THORNE ET AL., FEDERAL BROADBAND LAW § 10.11 (1995). 
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From these conditions we can see that granting a copyright 
entitlement that covers all forms of dissemination will have the effect 
of giving the pioneer industry the power to control the follow-on 
development of technology. Assuming that the pioneer controls the 
creation of content (either by controlling copyrights, vertical 
integration, or through simple economic dependence), it can dictate 
what happens and what does not. In the example of broadcast, if 
copyright in programming had clearly included future technologies 
like cable and satellite transmission, the decision to allow these 
dissemination technologies to develop would have rested with the 
broadcast industry.280 Everything then depends on whether 
policymakers believe that an incumbent can be trusted to promote, 
rather than to destroy, its technological rivals. 
Finally, there are a second set of reasons to question the model of 
broad initial entitlements. The model can only yield the claimed 
benefits when the entitlements can actually be enforced. For example, 
copyright was generally seen as unenforceable against casual home 
copying in the 1970s and early 1980s.281 While this point is complicated 
by improved technologies of copy protection, so long as there exist 
rights that would be extremely expensive to enforce, the model of 
broad initial grants cannot be a complete answer. 
In short, while there is much automatic support for a “flexible” or 
“future-proof” copyright, there seems less consideration of whether 
such a law would be good for innovation. The argument, however, can 
be made, and Peter Huber comes closest to making it. But while not 
conclusive, much recent economic thinking and even mainstream 
communications policy casts doubt on a model that grants the 
incumbent control over future inventions. 
E. Author-Driven Communications Policy? 
The analysis in this Part should make one thing clear: who owns or 
controls the relevant copyrights in an industry sets the nature of the 
competition and communications problems created. Authorial control 
of copyrights (as in the case of the ASCAP) will lead to potential 
pricing problems, but is less likely to lead to the problem of vertical 
foreclosure. Conversely, it is when an incumbent disseminator owns, 
or has effective control over, copyright that the potential for more 
troubling efforts to foreclose technological rivals emerges. 
This analysis makes the possibility of author-driven dissemination 
attractive. As a policy it would support broad and clear rights in 
 
280. Accord Trotter Hardy, Copyright and “New-Use” Technologies, 23 NOVA L. REV. 
657 (1999) (discussing new-use technology royalty obligations using “type-I” and “type-II” 
error methodology). 
281. See infra note 342 and accompanying text. 
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authors; authors should want maximum exposure for their work, 
regardless of dissemination media. And if an author decided not to 
release her works using a given technology (say, film), then we might 
expect this to reflect artistic, rather than anti-competitive, concerns. 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, this concept has been a long-time 
aspiration of copyright law: the hope that authors would one day 
become masters of their own destiny.282 In its latest form, the idea is 
that the emergence of digital media and the Internet may make 
authors the relevant actors for copyright’s communications policy. 
Jane Ginsburg’s words describe this school of thought: “I suggest that 
digital media, by making the means of production and dissemination 
available to any computer-equipped author, give authors a realistic 
opportunity to bring their works to the public without having to put 
themselves in thrall to traditional intermediaries.”283 A grant of greater 
authorial rights through copyright, according to Ginsburg, “not only 
enhances the moral appeal of the exercise of copyright, but also may 
offer the public an increased quantity and variety of works of 
authorship.”284 
If authorial control over copyrights could help control some of the 
most troubling anti-competitive consequences of copyright, how 
achievable is that vision? The problem remains what it always has 
been. Despite the fact that authors who are not employees nominally 
own copyrights upon creation, they rarely control copyrights. Most 
copyrights are contractually assigned to disseminators, owned by the 
employer through the work-for-hire doctrine, or otherwise effectively 
controlled by the disseminator.285 It is a function of the relative 
bargaining power of authors and disseminators. Unless this difference 
in power or the laws controlling copyright contracting changes, true 
authorial control of copyright will likely remain an attractive vision 
but not a discernable reality. 
Might digital dissemination technologies change things by 
strengthening the relative power of authors, as Ginsburg suggests? 
 
282. See, e.g., LYMAN RAY PATTERSON, COPYRIGHT IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 5 
(1968) (“Not until after the Statute of Anne did the modern idea of copyright as a right of 
the author develop.”). See generally LOEWENSTEIN, supra note 33. 
283. Ginsburg, supra note 20, at 1619. 
284. Id. Paul Goldstein’s vision of a “celestial jukebox” that stores all copyright works 
and makes them available on demand is also an author-driven vision. He writes: “by 
charging subscribers electronically for each use of the prerecorded works it offers — motion 
pictures, sound recordings, books, magazines, or newspaper articles — the celestial jukebox 
will be able to compensate copyright owners each time their works are chosen.” See 
GOLDSTEIN, supra note 20, at 23. 
285. See, e.g., ALBERT N. GRECO, THE BOOK PUBLISHING INDUSTRY 152-55 (1997) 
(providing a sample of typical publishing contract assigning copyright to publisher); Bruce 
H. Phillips & Carl R. Moore, Digital Performance Royalties: Should Radio Pay?, 3 VAND. J. 
ENT. L. & PRAC. 169 n.28 (2001) (noting that copyrights in the music industry are typically 
assigned to publishers and recording companies). 
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While the question is empirical, there are reasons to suspect that 
developments like the Internet or indeed any technologies are unlikely 
to eliminate the central role of disseminators and other intermediaries 
and their continued control over copyright. 
It is, first of all, hard to get rid of intermediaries for a reason 
having nothing to do with law or technology, but instead stemming 
from the basic theory of comparative advantage.286 Specialized 
intermediaries exist, after all, because they specialize in doing things 
that others do not necessarily do well themselves. Carpenters 
specialize in making furniture; while it is possible for others to make 
their own furniture, it comes at great tangible and opportunity cost. 
The logic of specialization carries over to the world of packaged 
information and suggests a continuing role for specialized 
disseminators. Authors, after constructing their own furniture, could 
also serve as their own publishers and publicists. But the author who 
does so will usually be at a disadvantage compared to one who 
collaborates with someone else, particularly someone like a publisher, 
who specializes in publication and publicity. Changes in technology 
have not changed that basic dynamic, even though today’s 
intermediaries have changed. 
While we are only a decade into the universalization of the 
Internet, there is limited evidence that it has eliminated the control 
that disseminators have over copyrights. There are a few examples of 
authors — often famous and rich — who have temporarily become 
their own disseminators. Stephen King, for example, famously 
distributed one of his books directly to his fans.287 Rapper Ice-T 
decided to distribute one of his albums, for $4.99 per copy, via the 
online distribution service KaZaA.288 Yet these are the exceptions. 
Even the Beatles, who founded Apple Records to give artists more 
power over their work,289 have many of their sound recording 
copyrights controlled by publisher EMI. That company has used its 
ownership of the Beatles’ copyrights to prevent unauthorized remixing 
 
286. The seminal statement of the theory of comparative advantage was made by David 
Ricardo. See DAVID RICARDO, PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY AND TAXATION 
(Prometheus Books 1996) (1817). See also Jack Goldsmith & Timothy Wu, The Return of 
the Leviathan ch. 4 (manuscript on file with author) (developing the point with regard to 
online activities). 
287. See Stephen King offers online thrills, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., July 24, 2000, at 
A5. 
288. See Ice T offers album for sale to music-swap site users, USA TODAY, April 10, 
2003, at http://www.usatoday.com/tech/webguide/internetlife/2003-04-10-icet-kazaa_x.htm 
(last visited Sept. 9, 2004). 
289. See generally BRUCE SPIZER, THE BEATLES ON APPLE RECORDS (2003) 
(describing reasons for the founding of Apple Records). 
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in rap songs, when it is not clear whether the Beatles themselves 
would have cared.290 
In short, despite centuries of good intentions, the goal of moving 
actual, as opposed to notional, control over copyright to authors 
remains unachieved. It remains for many an aspiration of copyright 
policy, and a communications analysis suggests the aspiration has 
independent economic justifications. But in the meantime, copyright 
theorists must continue to analyze a world in which various 
disseminators are the effective owners of copyright. This fact makes 
copyright’s role in communications policy more, not less, important. 
III. COPYRIGHT’S NEW COMMUNICATIONS POLICY 
The main point of this Article has been to describe copyright’s 
communications regime and to explain the choices it has been making. 
Up to this point we have focused on the “classic” communications 
regime, centered on compulsory licensing. Since the passage of the 
1976 Act, the legal operation of copyright’s communications policy has 
shifted in important and fundamental ways — enough to identify and 
describe a “new” communications regime. 
A. A Changing Code 
The 1976 Act marked an effort to solve many of copyright’s 
perceived communications-related problems once and for all. A key 
portion of the 1976 Act was the section 102 specification that 
copyright would subsist in “original works of authorship fixed in any 
tangible medium of expression, now known or later developed. . . .”291 
As the House Report explained, “[u]nder the bill it makes no 
difference what the form, manner, or medium of fixation may be.”292 
One hope was that the 1976 Act might “future-proof” the copyright 
code. 
It was not to be. As this Article has argued, conflict between 
dissemination rivals is probably inevitable as long as technological 
change creates the opportunity to undercut incumbents. It should 
therefore be no surprise that the 1976 Act failed to end the pattern of 
conflict that characterizes copyright’s history. Since that time, some 
challenges, such as satellite television and web-casting, have followed 
the classic pattern of copyright settlement centered on a compulsory 
license arrangement.293 But many of the technological challenges, from 
 
290. Noah Shachtman, Copyright Enters a Gray Area, WIRED NEWS, Feb. 14, 2004, at 
http://www.wired.com/news/print/0,1294,62276,00.html (last visited Sept. 13, 2004). 
291. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2000) (emphasis added). 
292. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 52 (1976). 
293. With results codified in 17 U.S.C. § 119 and § 114, respectively. 
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the VCR to the Digital Audio Tape (DAT) and onward have been 
handled in a very new manner, suggesting changes in the political 
economy of disseminator regulation. 
The best evidence of the change comes from the study of the 
copyright code itself. As David Nimmer has shown to great effect, we 
have witnessed a dramatic shift in the nature of copyright amendment 
over the last decade.294 Nimmer identifies a major turning point in the 
year 1992. After that year, says Nimmer, “each amendment outdoes its 
predecessor, not only for incoherence that commands national 
attention, but for pioneering new methods of bringing the legislative 
process into disrepute.”295 The post-1992 amendments, according to 
Nimmer, consist of “bloated provisions that do not meet the various 
criteria of formal lawmaking success.”296 
While Nimmer is focused on the form of copyright amendments, a 
simple read of the code confirms that something has indeed changed. 
First, the code now contains entire chapters, such as the anti-
bootlegging statute in section 1101, the anti-circumvention laws in 
section 1201, and part of the Audio Home Recording Act in section 
1008 that clearly regulate end-user behavior. Coupled with the 
enlargement of criminal liability in the 1997 No Electronic Theft Act, 
they constitute what can be described as an “anti-piracy” code and 
compromise some of the first, clearly-stated prohibitions on the 
behavior of non-commercial users in copyright’s history. 
Second, since 1992, the law has witnessed the addition of the first 
technology specific safe harbor regimes: section 1001 et seq, the safe 
harbors for digital audio recording devices, and section 512, the safe 
harbor regime for online service providers. While compulsory 
licensing regimes for specific technologies were a central feature of the 
classic regime, the safe harbor regimes are an obvious break from that 
model. 
Third, in addition to these statutory changes, since the early 1980s, 
the Sony rule has emerged as a key doctrine for determining the 
liability of manufacturers of devices that facilitate copying. The Sony 
rule is premised not on any provision of the copyright statute, but 
rather on judge-made secondary and vicarious liability principles, and 
represents a new type of judge-mediated communications policy. 
These three developments — the rise of end-user sanction regimes, 
safe harbors and judicially-managed market entry regimes — clearly 
require a new model for their political explanation. The next Section 
presents such a model. 
 
294. See David Nimmer, Codifying Copyright Comprehensibly, 51 UCLA L. REV. 1233, 
1238 (2004). 
295. Id. at 1381-82. 
296. Id. at 1238. 
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B. A Model for the Copyright’s New Communications Regime 
A central premise of the classic model was that new copyright law 
emerges from conflicts between technological incumbents and 
challengers. I suggest that the same basic model can help explain much 
of the post-1976 transformation of copyright’s communications policy 
and copyright law in general. The principal difference is institutional: 
it is a transformation in the identity of the challenger, and a 
corresponding change in the government protection sought. 
Douglass North has suggested that there are only two sources of 
institutional change: changes in relative prices and changes in tastes.297 
The changes to copyright’s communications regime described here can 
be succinctly described as the result of three distinct changes in 
relative prices. From the period of 1970-2000, three products became 
dramatically cheaper: analog copying technology (home tape 
recorders and VCRs), digital copying technology (the computer, and 
later devices like CD-burners) and, finally, mass distribution 
technology (the Internet). One upshot of these changes was the 
emergence of a new type of technological challenger to the copyright 
world. 
The new challenger can best be pictured as a team effort. The team 
consists of passive, enabling technologists paired with infringing 
users.298 Both have clearly identifiable interests in undercutting the 
incumbent. The technologist earns extra profits from providing users 
the ability to disseminate works without paying for permission. (A 
tape recorder is valuable not only for playing tapes, but also for its 
ability to record music that can be given to friends.) The infringing 
user does not profit (other than possibly in reputation) but saves, by 
not having to pay retail prices for copyrighted works.299 In short, 
infringing users equipped with copying technology take on the 
economic role previously occupied by challenger industries. 
These changes have transformed the political economy of 
copyright. Post-1976 copyright has pitted incumbents against two 
challengers: passive technological rivals and infringing users. The 
 
297. See DOUGLASS NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE, AND ECONOMIC 
PERFORMANCE 89 (1990). 
298. Some may object that the term “infringing users” states a legal conclusion. I use the 
term only as shorthand to denote users who incumbent disseminators see as a threat to their 
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299. On the behavior of infringing users and their interests, I have previously noted the 
tension between infringing users as a sub-group and users at large. See Wu, supra note 45, at 
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result is two new streams of copyright law that have emerged like 
plumes from twin exhaust pipes. 
The first stream consists of new copyright rules for the passive 
technologists: electronics manufacturers and telecommunications 
firms. These rules differ from some of the copyright settlements that 
have come before, for several reasons. First, in the conflicts that 
follow, the settlements have not taken the form of compulsory licenses 
but of safe harbors. The technologists are not interested in compulsory 
licenses because they do not need access to copyrighted works and 
hence do not bargain for them. The most important legal output from 
these conflicts are the Sony regime (a judge-run immunity scheme) 
and the safe harbor scheme for Internet Service Providers codified in 
section 512. Second, the technologists are more effective at influencing 
government than were their predecessors. When, for example, Sony or 
Bell Atlantic first began to offer dissemination technologies to their 
consumers, they were not startups but established and powerful firms, 
with long experience lobbying government. Their model was not 
entrepreneurial, but rather horizontal, market entry. As a result, the 
political conflicts between the technologists and the incumbent 
copyright disseminators have, in general, made for a fairer fight. 
The second stream of new law emerges from a legislative process 
that pits organized incumbents against infringing users. The results 
may constitute the institutional change with the longest lasting effects 
for copyright law as a whole. As I have written elsewhere, the 
copyright law long relied on a gatekeeper system for its enforcement: 
the targeting of specialized intermediaries.300 Until recently, 
enforcement against normal, non-commercial individuals was 
extremely rare, and effectively not a part of copyright. As the 
Technology Assessment Office wrote in the 1989, “[a]ll U.S. copyright 
law, including the Copyright Act of 1976, proceeds on the assumption 
that effective and efficient copying is a large-scale, publicly visible, 
commercial activity.”301 That has changed, and the conflict between 
incumbent disseminators and infringing users is open and obvious. 
The political economy of this conflict could not be any more different 
from that with the technologists. It is a conflict between organized 
industry groups and scattered individuals. As basic public choice 
theory would suggest, the legislative results are largely dictated by the 
organized, copyright-owning industries. 
The incumbent-user conflict has begat new laws regulating 
individual infringers, including the No Electronic Theft Act,302 the 
 
300. See Wu, supra note 45, at 685-86 (describing the evolution of copyright’s 
enforcement system).  
301. Office of Tech. Assessment, U.S. Cong., Copyright and Home Copying: 
Technology Challenges the Law 11 (Oct. 1989). 
302. Pub. L. No. 105-147, 111 Stat. 2678 (1997) [hereinafter NET Act]. 
WU 2 12/22/2004 3:33:06 PM 
November 2004] Copyright’s Communications Policy 345 
anti-bootlegging law (17 U.S.C. § 1101), the anti-circumvention 
portions of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (17 U.S.C. § 1201 et 
seq), and section 1008 of the Audio Digital Home Recording Act. 
Whether for good or for ill, these measures are hard to describe as 
settlements negotiated between incumbent industries and users as a 
group. In addition, the tension between disseminators and infringing 
users has led to some of the first lawsuits filed against “recreational” 
infringers in the history of copyright. 
With this new model in mind, we now turn to examining some of 
the most important episodes that have created copyright’s new 
communications policy. 
1. The Technologists 
In 1971, Congress commented that copyright was never meant to 
“restrain the home recording, from broadcasts or from tapes or 
records, of recorded performances.”303 That widespread assumption — 
that home copying was no threat to copyright-dependent industries — 
changed forever in November of 1975. 
That was the month Sony Japan began selling its first consumer 
version of the “Video Tape Recorder.” Selling for the suggested retail 
price of $2295, the floor model LV-1901 Betamax combined a 
nineteen-inch color television with a VCR capable of storing a full 
hour of television programming on a single cassette. The 
advertisement that launched the VCR conflict ran as follows:  
NOW YOU DON’T HAVE TO MISS KOJAK BECAUSE YOU’RE 
WATCHING COLUMBO (OR VICE VERSA)/BETAMAX — IT’S A 
SONY304 
With this advertisement, “time-shifting,” or recording programs to 
watch later, entered the public imagination. But the film industry was 
not impressed. Within a year, on November 11, 1976, Universal 
Studios and Walt Disney filed complaints of copyright infringement.305 
Some of the familiar patterns of copyright conflict were evident. 
Sony and other electronics manufacturers were offering a new and 
better way to watch broadcast content. Part of their market advantage, 
of course, came from not having to pay anything for copyright licenses 
to films and television programs. Yet there was one important 
difference between Sony and the challengers that came before it. As 
opposed to actively disseminating copyrighted works itself, Sony 
merely provided a technology that gave users the capacity to access 
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copyrighted works in new ways, and without paying royalties. This 
more passive role would ultimately work to Sony’s advantage in court. 
Meanwhile, the movie studios’ principal interest was, as in previous 
conflicts, seeking some means of control: either to stop the VCR or 
obtain a portion of its sales revenue in royalties. Both sides, as usual, 
went to the federal government to plead their case. 
Jack Valenti stated the film industry’s case in congressional 
hearings. The VCR, he opined, is “advertised for one purpose in 
life . . . . to copy copyrighted material that belongs to other people.”306 
But, Mr. Valenti warned: 
Nothing of value is free. It is very easy, Mr. Chairman, to convince the 
people that it is in their best interest to give away somebody else’s 
property for nothing, but even the most guileless among us know that 
this is a cave of illusion where commonsense is lured and then quietly 
strangled.307 
In addition to blaming Japanese VCRs for the American trade 
deficit, Valenti expressed a candid view of copyright as a form of 
protection for the film industry: 
[W]e are facing a very new and a very troubling assault on our fiscal 
security, on our very economic life and we are facing it from a thing 
called the video cassette recorder and its necessary companion called the 
blank tape. And it is like a great tidal wave just off the shore. This video 
cassette recorder and the blank tape threaten profoundly the life-
sustaining protection, I guess you would call it, on which copyright 
owners depend, on which film people depend, on which television people 
depend and it is called copyright.308 
As Valenti concluded, in what has become his most famous quote, 
“I say to you that the VCR is to the American film producer and the 
American public as the Boston strangler is to the woman home 
alone.” 
By 1981, the film industry had convinced the Ninth Circuit to hold 
Sony liable for contributing to the copyright infringement of home 
viewers.309 That court found that the videotape recorder had no 
purpose other than to infringe: it was “manufactured, advertised, and 
sold for the primary purpose of reproducing [copyrighted] television 
programming.”310 Since the court could find no exception in the 
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copyright code for personal or home copying, Sony was infringing. 
The court suggested either placing a permanent injunction on the sale 
of the VCR or setting up a royalty scheme, i.e., a judicial version of a 
compulsory license. 
Within twenty-four hours of the decision, both sides went to 
Congress with different proposals. The electronics industry wanted a 
full exemption from copyright liability for home video recording.311 
The film industry counteroffered with an exemption tied to a royalty 
scheme for the film and television industries.312 It seemed that the 
VCR matter would follow the pattern of the classic communications 
regime, and end in a congressionally implemented settlement. 
But the Supreme Court upstaged Congress with its first major 
copyright communications policy case since Fortnightly. In Sony the 
Court sided with the electronics industry, delivering the exemption 
from copyright they were seeking in Congress. The Court did so by 
holding that the VCR would be exempt from contributory or vicarious 
copyright liability provided that its technologies were, in fact, 
technologies of general or broad purpose.313 As Justice Stevens stated 
in his oft-cited Sony rule, “the sale of copying equipment, like the sale 
of other articles of commerce, does not constitute contributory 
infringement if the product is widely used for legitimate, 
unobjectionable purposes.”314 To put the matter further: “Indeed, [the 
technology] need merely be capable of substantial noninfringing 
uses.”315 
Even by some of its former critics, Sony is acclaimed if not for its 
analysis, for its foresight. As Edward Samuels, a skeptic at the time, 
writes, “the VCR turned out to be one of the most lucrative inventions 
— for movie producers as well as hardware manufacturers — since 
movie projectors.”316 Unlike the other major copyright 
communications cases, Sony did not lead to the formal establishment 
of a liability regime. As detailed by James Lardner, the film industry 
slowly began to take a softer line after the Court’s ruling. The industry 
itself concluded that “squelching” the VCR was not necessarily in its 
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interest.317 This judgment was correct: in time the VCR became a 
major source of revenue for the film and broadcast industries.318 
The Sony decision will always be open to the criticism that the 
Court could have done more to differentiate between VCRs that 
record and VCRs that simply play pre-recorded videos. But as a 
pragmatic matter, one reason Sony may have succeeded is that it self-
consciously abandoned a simple authorship analysis when faced with 
the use of copyright by an incumbent industry to control or block 
legitimate technological rivals.319 The Sony rule can be understood as a 
rule to help a court distinguish between problems of authorship and 
the more difficult problems of competition among disseminators. The 
fact that a new communications technology can be used for 
“legitimate, unobjectionable purposes” establishes that the court is 
faced with a market entrant, as opposed to mere evasion of the 
copyright statute. Therefore the court knows that it faces a problem of 
regulating competition among rivals, and acts accordingly. Conversely, 
if the technology in question is used to infringe, the court is faced with 
a problem where protecting authorship incentives predominates. This 
division is suggested by the Court’s statement that “[s]ound policy, as 
well as history, supports our consistent deference to Congress when 
major technological innovations alter the market for copyrighted 
materials. Congress has the constitutional authority and the 
institutional ability to accommodate fully the varied permutations of 
competing interests that are inevitably implicated by such new 
technology.”320 
There is an important difference between the Sony rule and the 
unanchored “free pass” for new technologies found in cases like 
Teleprompter. Sony forces federal courts to pass judgment on new 
technologies, to act as a kind of technological gatekeeper. The courts 
must make some assessment of whether, on balance, the likely harm 
created by the subject technology — most obviously, through damage 
to creation incentives — actually makes market entry desirable. The 
Sony rule therefore requires courts to develop some concept of 
“legitimate” technology that constitutes a bona fide market entrant. 
Its suggestion is very open-ended: being “capable of substantial non-
infringing uses” is good enough. 
The Sony rule puts courts in an odd position, for they must rely on 
their instincts and the limited evidence before them to decide whether 
a new technology seems legitimate. The fact that so many now-
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mainstream communications technologies were born as pirates further 
complicates matters. These limits of judicial competence might suggest 
a lenient reading of the Sony rule, but some have come to the opposite 
conclusion. Randy Picker sees Sony as a rule of entry that is too 
lenient. In his view, the Sony rule by its own logic allows harmful 
market entry: it would allow market entry of a product that had $100 
of legitimate use, but causes a $1000 harm through loss of creation 
incentives. Allowing such a product to be on the market is therefore, 
according to Picker, a bad result. 
But there are good responses to Picker’s argument which support a 
lenient market entry rule for new communications technologies. The 
first is institutional. If a court using the Sony rule gets it wrong and 
allows technological market entry that turns out to be harmful, 
Congress can later reverse the determination. Indeed, had the Sony 
decision led to the near-collapse of the film industry, surely a 
congressional remedy would have been forthcoming. Conversely, 
court suppression of a new technology is, for all intents and purposes, 
congressionally irreversible. A new technologist almost by definition 
has little chance of convincing Congress to reverse a copyright 
holding. 
Second, Picker’s view may put too much faith in the courts to act 
as accurate gatekeepers of market entry. It is certainly beyond the 
ability of a court, or indeed anyone, to accurately predict the future 
social benefit of a new technology — such are the teachings of 
evolutionary innovation theory.321 To compare the future benefit to 
the present and future harm introduces still greater chances for error. 
For one thing judges might, like other governmental actors, 
consistently overrate present and visible harms.322 Picker does 
acknowledge that the assessment of benefit should include the 
possibility that the technology will turn out to be much more socially 
beneficial than originally imagined, but he does not develop the point 
further.323 
Innovation theory teaches that predicting the evolution of 
technology is difficult, making it important to let the market assess the 
potential of any new technology, whether a mousetrap, molecule, or 
copying device. This suggests that the government should ban a new 
technology only if the harm of allowing the technology to reach the 
market very clearly outweighs the benefits. These are not 
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controversial sentiments outside of the copyright debate. Government 
only very rarely reaches out to ban technological developments that 
might be harmful, even those that distress people like genetic 
engineering. In copyright, the equivalent policy is the lenient version 
of the Sony rule. It asks judges to filter clearly illegitimate 
technological uses, such as those that could not survive but for the 
advantage of piracy. It leaves the rest to the market and Congress if 
the court is terribly wrong. This formulation of the Sony rule might 
occasionally lead to dramatic results, but creative destruction is not a 
dinner party. 
Whether Sony is too lenient or too strict a rule of market entry 
remains an open question.324 But the case’s institutional significance 
for copyright’s communications policy cannot be doubted. Sony set 
the precedent for settling technological rivalry problems with 
judicially-balanced immunity rules. It is the foundation and 
centerpiece of copyright’s new communications policy. 
2. Internet Service Providers 
By the early-1990s it was already clear that a new technology and a 
new industry benefited from copyright infringement and represented a 
threat to traditional disseminators. That new technology was the 
Internet, and the benefiting industry was the Internet Service 
Providers. 
The response to this threat was not modest. As the Internet 
became mainstream, the incumbent disseminators proposed a 
sweeping set of copyright reforms. Most were adopted as Clinton 
administration policy by the Commerce Department, and published as 
the 1995 Report on Intellectual Property and the National Information 
Infrastructure, better known as the “White Paper.”325 In retrospect, the 
publication of the White Paper was the opening shot in what became a 
grand legislative battle between traditional copyright disseminators 
and their internet challengers. 
The White Paper adopted the position that the greatest potential 
of the Internet depended on expanded copyright protection. “The full 
potential of the NII,” it said “will not be realized if the education, 
information and entertainment products protected by intellectual 
property laws are not protected effectively when disseminated via the 
NII.”326 For copyright purposes, the White Paper’s implementation 
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contemplated two major sets of changes: one targeted at infringing 
users, and another at ISPs. In short, White Paper targeted the two 
groups who posed a challenge to existing models of dissemination. 
The first group of important proposals consisted of two new “anti-
piracy” reforms. The White Paper argued that “current law is 
insufficient to prevent flagrant copyright violations” in the Internet 
context.327 It proposed expanding the criminal side of copyright to 
make non-profit, or “recreational piracy” of copyrighted works 
criminal.328 The second proposal was also directed at individual 
pirates, aiming to stop copy-protection systems, or “digital locks,” 
from being circumvented. As the White Paper argued, “technological 
protection likely will not be effective unless the law also provides 
some protection for the technological processes and systems used to 
prevent or restrict unauthorized uses of copyrighted works.”329 It 
proposed more criminal liability, and also liability for traffickers of 
protection-breaking technologies. We’ll come back to both these 
proposals later. 
The second major proposed reform was a clear recognition of 
“transmission,” including digital transmission, as a form of 
“reproduction,” or copying under the copyright statute. The White 
Paper took the position that this would merely reaffirm established 
law, but that position was slightly misleading. The liability of ISPs for 
copyright infringement occurring on their networks was, at the time, 
still an open question.330 The White Paper argued in favor: “Service 
providers reap rewards for infringing activity. It is difficult to argue 
that they should not bear the responsibilities.”331 Since ISPs are “in a 
better position to prevent or stop infringement than the copyright 
owner,” the White Paper concluded, “the best policy is to hold the 
service provider liable.”332 
To this conclusion the service provider industry took great 
exception. From their view, the White Paper’s proposals had the 
potential to put the industry on the hook for a massive volume of 
copyright infringement practiced via the Internet, and in least in 
theory, billions in statutory damages. As the White Paper proposals 
quickly became bills in the House and Senate, the threat woke up the 
ISP industry and the power of its lobby. This must be understood 
clearly: the ISP industry, while in parts new, also included many 
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powerful telecommunications companies like Bell Atlantic and 
AT&T, long-term players with deep experience with 
telecommunications regulation. These companies ordered their 
lobbyist armies in Washington to fight the copyright threat both in the 
capital and in Geneva. Bruce Lehman, then Patent and Trademark 
Commissioner, characterized matters well: “You’ve got two gigantic, 
very powerful industries in Washington: the telephone companies and 
the computer industry on one side, the content industries, the record 
companies, the movie industry on the other.”333 He predicted that 
“they won’t make a deal with each other until they start counting 
votes in Congress.” He was right. 
In an early victory for the ISP industry, neither 1995 bill made it 
out of committee, despite Jack Valenti’s warning that without 
congressional action, “the information superhighway . . . will collapse 
the great wonder of intellectual property.”334 The Commerce 
Department, however, took the substance of its proposals to Geneva. 
That’s where the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) 
was working on “digital-era” amendments to the Berne Convention, 
the world’s principal copyright treaty. The strategy — mostly 
successful — was to join with European allies to negotiate a treaty 
comprising much of the substance contained in the 1995 Act, as part of 
the effort to bring the law back to Washington as a treaty-
implementing measure. 
In December 1996 WIPO convened its diplomatic conference in 
Geneva to consider several new copyright treaties. While nominally a 
meeting of nation-states, domestic lobbyists of all stripes were in 
attendance, including American representatives from both the 
traditional disseminators and ISP industries. Much lobbying effort 
centered on Article 7(1) of the draft WIPO Copyright Treaty, which 
was a replica of the White Paper’s “transmission” proposal.335 It stated 
that the “right of reproduction” shall include “direct or indirect 
reproduction . . . whether permanent or temporary, in any manner or 
form.” The draft treaty also created an exception for “transient or 
incident” reproduction, Article 7(2), designed to favor ISPs.336 But the 
ISP industry, rightly or wrongly, felt that the broad language of 7(1) 
was dangerously close to strict liability for all temporary copies of 
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works passing through their networks. Some Internet carriers 
analogized themselves to the Postal Service: “Just like the postal 
service cannot (and indeed should not) monitor the contents of all the 
envelopes it handles, it is simply not possible for an infrastructure 
provider to monitor whether the millions of electronic messages it 
transmits daily have been authorized.”337 
To the surprise of some observers, close to the end of negotiations, 
Article 7 was deleted from the WIPO Treaty in its entirety. While 
explanations for the deletion vary, both the ISPs and entertainment 
industries claimed victory.338 Meanwhile, the rest of the White Paper 
proposals survived, including, most-importantly to the copyright 
owners, the central anti-circumvention proposal. The legislative fight 
returned to Washington. Said Larry Clinton, a Bell lobbyist, “[t]his 
battle has been going on for a year from our point of view, so it’s 
continuing — not brewing.”339 
As the White Paper and Geneva processes played out, the 
judiciary entered the picture, deciding several important cases in the 
Ninth Circuit. As in other copyright conflicts, the decisions mostly 
strengthened the hand of challengers (the ISPs) and above all changed 
the baselines for negotiation. The most politically important case was 
Religious Technology Center. v. Netcom On-Line Communication 
Services.340 Netcom was the first true ISP liability case, and to the 
delight of the ISP industry, the district court rejected a rule of direct 
liability for the ISP. Said the court, “it does not make sense to adopt a 
rule that could lead to the liability of countless parties whose role in 
the infringement is nothing more than setting up and operating a 
system that is necessary for the functioning of the Internet.”341 The 
Netcom court did, however, find that liability was possible on what 
became known as a “notice-and-take-down” theory. It held that actual 
notice of a user’s infringing actions could create a duty on the part of 
the ISP to take preventive measures (a “take-down”), else 
contributory copyright liability. 
The Netcom rule was not, of course, the full immunity that the ISP 
industry might have preferred. And it was also only a district court 
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decision.342 But Netcom’s rejection of direct liability contradicted the 
White Paper’s assumption that ISPs would be directly liable. It also 
granted substantially more protection than the levels of liability sought 
by the traditional incumbents and proposed by the WIPO Draft 
Treaty. Preserving the protections of Netcom became an industry 
mantra. 
Meanwhile, back in Washington, the slow-motion legislative 
struggle continued. To strengthen their hand, the ISPs turned to their 
champion, Senator John Ashcroft, who proposed legislation that 
would have come close to completely immunizing the ISP industry 
from secondary copyright liability.343 In the summer of 1997 the 
Commerce Department finally sent over its legislation for 
implementing the WIPO treaty, including the controversial anti-
circumvention rules.344 And in search of compromise, Representative 
Coble introduced what the ISPs wanted: an On-Line Copyright 
Liability Limitation Act, H.R. 2180.345 
At this point the legislative calculus put ISPs and traditional 
copyright owners in a slightly complex standoff. The copyright owners 
most of all wanted treaty-ratification and implementation of most of 
all the anti-circumvention measures they had fought for in the WIPO 
Copyright Treaty and the White Paper.346 While their preference for 
ISPs was still strict liability, it was by now clear that such prospects 
were dim. They bet, instead, that Netcom would not last, and that the 
courts would ultimately deliver ISP liability. The ISPs had good reason 
to fear that Netcom might be an aberration, and wanted, more than 
anything, to codify that decision in strong liability-limiting legislation. 
Their bargaining chip was enough influence over key members of 
Congress to block the anti-circumvention rules unless the copyright 
owners agreed to their liability limits. Finally, for both ISPs and 
copyright owners there were dangers waiting. The ISPs risked the 
erosion of their Netcom position through ongoing litigation. And for 
copyright owners the entire investment in the White Paper / WIPO 
process was in jeopardy. 
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New Congressional hearings came in September of 1997, where the 
telecommunications and entertainment industries went head-to-
head.347 Jack Valenti from the film industry used his time to attack the 
ISP’s liability-limitation bill, calling it an effort to “weaken” copyright. 
Passing the bill, he said, would create “a clear and present danger, 
inviting the slow undoing of America’s most precious trade asset, its 
native-born intellectual property.”348 Hilary Rosen, President of the 
RIAA, was more aggressive. She accused the telecommunications 
industry of holding “hostage” the treaty process, stating, “I urge you 
not to let the “Online Service Provider” debate . . . slow deliberation 
on this issue when swift U.S. Congressional action is so important to 
U.S. economic interests around the globe.” Following tradition, the 
recording industry brought an artist, this time country singer Johnny 
Cash, to speak on the evils of piracy. But things did not go exactly as 
planned: Cash departed from his prepared text, blurting out that he’d 
actually sold his foreign copyrights years ago.349 
Roy Neel, a close friend of Vice President Al Gore, testified on 
behalf of the powerful Bell Companies. A week earlier, he had made 
it clear in Senate testimony that the Bells would block any Treaty-
implementation bill that lacked a provision limiting ISP liability.350 In 
the House, Neel advocated as much immunity as possible, charging 
that “copyright law threatens to put a damper on the expression of 
ideas on the Internet.” He also accused the entertainment industries of 
trying to sue ISPs out of existence. “[W]hile [the Telecom Industry is] 
committed to the Internet, the threat of copyright lawsuits is becoming 
an increasingly salient consideration in offering the service at all.” 
(For his part, Representative Barney Frank commented “I have never 
encountered so many people who seem to me to be well off and doing 
quite well feeling so victimized.”)351 
Settlement came in the Spring. A joint bill, now named the Digital 
Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) was introduced on April 1, 1998. 
The new bill represented a deal between the ISPs and traditional 
copyright owners that merged their principal interests. The anti-
circumvention laws became Title I of the Act, while the On-Line 
Copyright Liability Limitation Act became Title II. This left only user 
groups to deal with, many of whom, joined by the occasional copyright 
professor, argued that the law would erode fair-use rights. Professor 
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Peter Jaszi, for example, argued that the law “would effectively gut 
fair use by giving copyright owners broad new authority to block what 
are now lawful acts.”352 But as public choice theory might predict, user 
groups lacked the power to stop Title I. Instead, various legitimate 
user-groups (like libraries) were granted specific exceptions, along 
with the possibility for more down the line, creating a legislative 
product of extraordinary complexity. After several more months of 
wrangling for exceptions, President Clinton signed the entire Act into 
law on October 28, 1998. He remarked, without irony, that the Act 
“reflects the diligence and talents of a great many people.”353 
The final compromise on ISP liability was codified as 17 U.S.C.  
section 512. This is not the place for a full description of section 512 
and its complexities. But the law is notable for using a highly 
characteristic device for managing copyright’s relationships: statutory 
safe harbors.354 Technologists, unlike the challengers of the “classic” 
period, do not need access to copyrighted works to make money, and 
do not bargain for compulsory licenses. Instead, they seek statutory 
versions of the Sony rule: provisions that establish under what 
conditions a given technology will be free from copyright liability. In 
the case of section 512, the end result was rather close to the 
codification of the Netcom rule that the ISPs sought. 
It is true that section 512 has created some problems and certainly 
some unexpected consequences. Depending on what you take as your 
baseline, it is also true that section 512 has either increased the costs of 
business for service providers or made copyright infringement more 
difficult to police. But like many of the copyright settlements 
described here, the rule’s accomplishment is the reduction of some 
uncertainty as between the parties. For better or for worse, section 512 
must be taken as the definitive example of copyright’s new 
communications policy in action. 
C. Toward Greater Control of End-Users 
As copyright’s new communications policy has developed, the 
change with perhaps the greatest long-term consequences the effort to 
change the relationship between disseminators and users. For the first 
time, consumers themselves (at least some of them) have formed part 
of the threat to the market position of the incumbents. As a result, 
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laws have been enacted that for the first time clearly and explicitly 
govern user behavior. In addition, users, as opposed to specialized 
intermediaries, have been sued for violating the law of copyright. 
In the 1990s, an unofficial “anti-piracy” code was added to the 
copyright law through three amendments: the No Electronic Theft 
(“NET”)Act, the Anti-bootlegging law, 17 U.S.C. § 1101, and Title I 
of the DMCA, the anti-circumvention law provisions, whose 
enactment was just discussed. We look here at two of those 
amendments. 
1. The No Electronic Theft Act 
In 1993, David LaMacchia was a 20-year-old student at the 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology and also the operator of a 
pirate bulletin board system named “Cynosure.” His board made 
available free copies of expensive commercial software programs like 
Excel, WordPerfect and Simcity.355 
Unfortunately for LaMacchia, word got out and one day he was 
arrested. Boston’s U.S. Attorney, Donald Stern, announced the arrest, 
stressing the economic costs of software piracy. “The pirating of 
business and entertainment software through clandestine computer 
bulletin boards is tremendously costly to software companies, and by 
extension, the economy.”356 
But LaMacchia was a different kind of copyright infringer than the 
criminal provisions of the copyright code had contemplated. He was 
what is called a “recreational pirate”: he earned no money from his 
enterprise, nor anything that might be termed a “commercial 
advantage.” As of 1994 criminal copyright punished only infringement 
“for purposes of commercial advantage or private financial gain.”357 
LaMacchia’s free bulletin board satisfied neither element. He was, as 
this Article has described, the perfect example of a “user” infringer. 
He disseminated copyrighted works for fun and a kind of glory. 
These facts, however, made him no less of a threat to the software 
industry’s business model. LaMacchia was not, of course, a direct 
competitor to software companies as a creator of software. But he was, 
in effect, a rival disseminator. And just like many challengers 
considered in this Article, LaMacchia was a disseminator not covered 
by the Copyright statute. The federal district court quickly dismissed 
his prosecution, and in 1994, David LaMacchia went free.358 
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Recreational piracy like LaMacchia’s was criminalized in 1997. As 
discussed above, the 1995 White Paper proposed a legislative response 
to the LaMacchia case, and it came in 1997, as the No Electronic Theft 
Act. The NET Act eliminated the requirement of commercial profit 
that had been a part of the law since 1897.359 First, “financial gain” 
would be defined to include “receipt, or expectation of receipt, of 
anything of value, including the receipt of other copyrighted works.”360 
This language would make private, quid-pro-quo trading of copyright 
works a criminal offense. Second, the Act added that infringement of 
more than $1000 worth of copyright works within a 180 day period 
would constitute criminal copyright infringement.361 While this 
language would not cover one-time, casual infringement, it would 
cover anyone who, for example, used a substantial amount of 
infringing software on their computer. 
Unsurprisingly, the NET Act did not encounter substantial 
legislative resistance. Framed by its sponsors as a law meant to close a 
loophole in the copyright law, it passed the House by a voice vote, and 
passed the Senate unanimously. The contrast with the DMCA 
enactment process, or indeed any of the conflicts considered in this 
Article, could not be starker. There were no protracted negotiations 
or battles, nor a struggle between the software industry and a putative 
“National Association of Pirate Bulletin Boards.” In Congressional 
hearings held a week before the contentious WIPO Implementation 
hearings, not a single witness testified against the Act.362 Both the 
interest in a NET Act and the relative ease with which it was passed 
show how the political economy of copyright amendment has changed. 
Since its enactment in 1997, the NET Act has been used to 
prosecute slightly over 80 people, all for non-profit “sharing” of 
copyrighted works.363 The Justice Department has yet to lose a case. 
Of those sentenced to prison, the average length is approximately 25.7 
months; the longest jail sentence was forty-six months and the shortest 
was four months.364 Robin Rothberg represents a typical software 
prosecution. The 34-year-old Boston-area computer consultant was 
convicted as the leader of “Pirates With Attitude,” an online software-
piracy group.365 He was sentenced 18 months in federal prison. The 
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first film infringement prosecution came in 2000, when 25-year-old 
Jason Spatafore was charged with criminally infringing copyright in 
the film “Star Wars: The Phantom Menance.”366 Spatafore was 
indicted after uploading portions of the Star Wars prequel to various 
web sites and encouraging others to download it. 
The point here is not to debate the merits of the NET Act. The 
point is to show how the potential for users to act as rival 
disseminators has led to a growth of copyright’s direct regulation of 
end users. That is a change copyright’s communications regime, and 
one with potentially long-lasting consequences for the nature of 
copyright itself. 
2. The Anti-Circumvention Provisions of the DMCA 
The anti-circumvention provisions of the DMCA (codified in 17 
U.S.C. § 1201 et seq) have been understood in many different ways by 
different people. The law and its effects (intended and otherwise) are 
too complicated to give full treatment here. The only point of 
relevance is that the anti-circumvention rules are perhaps best 
understood as a legislative byproduct of the conflict between 
disseminators and consumers in the 1990s. As Peter Menell writes, 
“analogous concerns” lay behind the anti-circumvention law and the 
NET Act: the suppression of “digital piracy.”367 
Unlike many of the other amendments studied in this Article, the 
anti-circumvention rules do not target an industry rival or 
technological challenger. They do not fit the pattern of, for example, 
the broadcasters’ efforts against cable, ASCAP’s efforts to derive 
revenue from radio, or the proposed royalty scheme for the VCR. 
Instead, the point of the anti-circumvention laws was to supplement 
technological efforts (digital locks) to make home copying more 
expensive if not impossible. Considered as a package with encryption 
initiatives, it becomes clear that the goal was eliminating the threat 
from infringing consumers acting as rival disseminators. 
In 1995, when the anti-circumvention rules were first placed before 
Congress, Jack Valenti argued powerfully that the goal of anti-
circumvention laws was to fight piracy, and as such any law must 
include criminal punishments. “One key weapon in our anti-piracy 
arsenal,” he said, “is technology itself: electronic locks of various kinds 
that seek to prevent high-tech burglars from breaking, entering, and 
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plundering our intellectual property.”368 For anti-circumvention laws 
to work, he said “Criminal sanctions are essential. Too many NII 
bandits, some operating totally in the underground economy, will scoff 
at the threat of civil damages, which many regard as simply a cost of 
doing business.”369 The emphasis on criminal liability is consistent with 
efforts, like the NET Act discussed above, to regulate infringing users, 
and not just large intermediaries. 
Understanding the anti-circumvention laws as part of an anti-
piracy campaign helps explain the very odd structure of the exceptions 
found in section 1201. As discussed above, unlike many of the other 
conflicts studied here, and unlike section 512 as a direct comparison, 
there was no direct conflict between industries that led to the anti-
circumvention laws. There was no “circumvention” industry 
demanding a safe harbor or compulsory licensing scheme. Instead, the 
prohibitions in section 1201 includes particularized and confusing 
exceptions for certain types of users: libraries, law enforcement and 
government users, the software industry, and encryption 
researchers.370 It also creates the possibility for other exceptions by 
stating that it preserves fair use and creating a rule-making process for 
other exceptions conducted by the Library of Congress.371 These 
exceptions are obvious accommodations to user groups who happened 
to be party to the legislative process. But it must again be stressed how 
different the result is as compared with the process of copyright 
settlement between rival industries. A represented industry does not 
ask for the preservation of “fair use”; it demands an exception written 
for itself. Section 1201 of the DMCA and the confusion that surrounds 
it are, in other words, a result attributable to the unusual political 
economy surrounding copyright in the 1990s and persisting today. 
D. The War Over Online Distribution 
In the 2000s, it is difficult to pick up a newspaper or magazine 
without seeing something about an ongoing “war” between the 
entertainment industry (Los Angeles) and computer programmers 
(San Francisco). Some of the excitement and rhetoric have masked the 
basic questions of communications policy presented. 
What is termed the California civil war reveals the patterns of 
conflict between challenger and incumbent dissemination industries 
described here. The incumbent, the existing recording industry, relies 
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on “fixed” distribution: distribution of content fixed in CDs, DVDs or 
books, sold in retail stores. The challenger is the team effort described 
above: an (intentionally) passive online technologist coupled with 
highly active infringing users. As between online and retail 
distribution, neither from first principles has the obvious upper hand. 
Online distribution does eliminate many overhead costs (e.g., retail 
stores) and should be cheaper; it also provides customers the ability to 
get copyrighted content without actually going to a store. But fixed 
media has the advantage of the fixed form, packaging, and in some 
cases a superior product (real books are beautiful, very portable, and 
operate without batteries). Were neutral conditions of competition to 
apply, it might be a fair fight. But fair fights have never been a feature 
of the history of new communications technologies. We must look to 
see how copyright sets the stage for competition between incumbent 
and challenger. 
Like their predecessors, certain online distributors have taken 
advantage of copyright “piracy” to gain an advantage over the 
incumbent. This was a particularly salient issue with respect to music, 
and the ability to appropriate copyrighted material was behind the 
growth of well-known companies like Napster and KaZaA. To repeat 
a point made earlier, the structure of the 1976 Act makes trying to rely 
on the ambiguity of the copyright statute (like the recording industry 
in 1909 or cable in the 1950s) a dicey proposition.372 Instead, the 
historical infrequency and high cost of end-user enforcement were the 
vulnerabilities exploited by programmers.373 It is important to 
understand that pure “peer-to-peer” filesharing programs are not 
necessarily the best systems of online distribution. Their popularity 
and comparative advantage lies in the fact that they are designed to 
evade copyright’s enforcement system, and therefore minimize the 
price of an essential input (copyrighted materials).374 
Meanwhile, the incumbent recording industry, like some of its 
predecessors, has done just what it can to gain control over the 
challengers. What is distinctive about these efforts is the extent to 
which they target both the challenger disseminators and its users. The 
full extent of their efforts has been detailed elsewhere: it includes 
entirely new strategies of enforcement, such as the dramatic targeting 
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of end-users,375 investments in extralegal remedies,376 and demands 
that the Justice Department use criminal sanctions.377 The recording 
and film industries, like other incumbents, have not shown an interest 
in destroying online distribution. It is a question of control: the 
industry would prefer to steward the arrival of online distribution 
technology, so that it arrives on their schedule and creates collectible 
revenue.378 
While the basic question of online distribution is mainly a question 
of communications policy, the rhetoric of authorship is nonetheless 
pervasive. Early on, Metallica Drummer Lars Ulrich said he found 
Napster “sickening,” for use of Napster, in his view, constituted 
“stealing” and was “morally and legally wrong.”379 On the other side, 
artists like Public Enemy’s Chuck D speak of the benefits of online 
distribution as an authorship issue. In 2000, in Napster’s glory days, he 
wrote in the New York Times that artists “should think of it as a new 
kind of radio — a promotional tool that can help artists who don’t 
have the opportunity to get their music played on mainstream radio or 
on MTV . . . . The Internet has created a new planet for musicians to 
explore, and I’m with that.”380 
What can the communications policy perspective tell us? On the 
one hand, the recording industry’s efforts to control online 
distribution are a classic example of the vertical foreclosure discussed 
in Part II. Online distribution is a rival technology to the recording 
industry’s existing distribution of compact discs. The industry would 
like to use their control over copyright, an essential input, to control 
how and when online distribution reaches consumers. From this 
perspective the copyright lawsuits are suspect as a barrier to free 
technological competition. But that is not the end of the analysis, 
because unlike other technological challengers throughout history, it is 
not at all clear that entities like Napster, Aimster, or KaZaA represent 
legitimate market entrants. The complicated part is that peer-to-peer 
file-sharing networks and online music distribution are not the same 
thing: P2P networks are a particularly harmful form of online 
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distribution, at least as measured by the potential loss of revenue to 
creators. 
The communications policy perspective, in other words, sees 
online distribution as a weighing of two costs, both difficult to assess. 
On one side are the costs of the foreclosure, which are the forgone 
benefits of the new technology and of disrupting the market power of 
existing content industries. On the other side are the lost incentives for 
new authors and value (if any) of the reliance interests in the property 
rights guaranteed the copyright law. Weighing these two costs leads to 
a spectrum of plausible policy positions on the question of online 
content distribution, each of which reflects different views of national 
communications policy. We can group them into three basic positions 
(reflecting the policies described in Part II): open, stewarded, and 
judicially balanced. 
The open position is highly optimistic about the market and the 
process of creative destruction. A strong proponent of an open 
communications policy would give online distribution systems an 
exemption from contributory copyright liability despite the fact that 
they can be demonstrated to harm or even destroy authorial 
incentives. The article of faith is that such action, however traumatic in 
the short term for both disseminators and creators, will not destroy 
authorial incentives in the long term. If that is correct, consumer 
welfare will be served both in the short term (free content) and also 
the long term (cheaper content). But how might authorial incentives 
be restored? There are two possible accounts. First, there is faith that 
the demands of the market will necessarily recreate authorial 
incentives from somewhere, even if it is hard to specify where right 
now. If an online distributor like KaZaA becomes a powerful 
distributor of music, it will have a natural need to see its content 
creators survive, and therefore create some mechanism for paying 
authors. An alternative view places faith in the political process. 
Exempting the P2P companies from copyright liability could force 
some matters into copyright’s classic communications regimes, forcing 
a settlement that will liberate online music distribution.381 
The Ninth Circuit’s 2004 MGM v. Grokster decision adopts the 
“open” policy in strong fashion.382 Judge Thomas’s decision, if 
affirmed by the Supreme Court and not annulled by Congress, would 
create wide-open competition amongst music disseminators. As the 
court stated in a crucial passage: 
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The introduction of new technology is always disruptive to old markets, 
and particularly to those copyright owners whose works are sold through 
well-established distribution mechanisms. Yet, history has shown that 
time and market forces often provide equilibrium in balancing interests, 
whether the new technology be a player piano, a copier, a tape recorder, 
a video recorder, a personal computer, a karaoke machine, or an MP3 
player.383 
The court’s view that the copyright market can correct any chaos 
created by copyright infringement is a clear endorsement of a policy of 
open market entry. 
The diametric opposite to the radical open position is the 
stewardship position. The open position’s alleged faith in the political 
process and free market does not impress proponents of a steward-
based communications policy. In their view, copyright is property, and 
property is a market precondition. To argue that the state should 
allow an exemption to the enforcement of property rights to promote 
the functioning of the market is a logical contradiction. The 
stewardship view at its strongest also believes that the incumbent 
industry can and should be trusted to introduce online dissemination 
in an efficient and timely manner.384 
In the P2P debate, the draft Induce Act, introduced in the summer 
of 2004, embodies the stewardship position.385 The law created 
copyright liability for anyone who “intentionally induces” 
infringement of copyrighted works. The term “induces,” moreover, 
was defined to mean “aids, abets, induces, or procures” while the test 
for “intention” was defined to include whether a party “relies on 
infringement for its commercial viability.” In short, the Act was 
written to make the passive but knowing facilitation of copyright 
infringement illegal, thereby making copyright owners the stewards 
not of online music distribution, but possibly of other passive 
distribution technologies as well. 
The third view puts the judiciary in charge of overseeing market 
entry based on its assessment of harms. Unlike the stewarded view, it 
sees incumbent control of a new technology as undesirable, yet is 
sensitive, unlike the radically open view, to the destruction of creative 
incentives. Hence it asks the judiciary to determine whether a pirate 
industry is likely to become a legitimate market player. The effect is to 
call for the greatest judicial involvement and oversight of the three 
views described here. The radically open view would abandon the 
future of content distribution to market forces or Congress, while the 
stewardship view places the incumbent in a position to decide when 
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and how online distribution will arrive. But the intermediate position 
in Napster and Aimster puts the federal judiciary in a position of 
continuing supervision of the online distribution industry, waiting for 
the moment that the pirate becomes legitimate. 
The clearest example of this approach is Judge Richard Posner’s 
Aimster decision, which is unusually candid about the competitive 
consequences of the case.386 The decision opens with a rejection of the 
stewardship model as contrary to Sony: the recording industry had 
argued that actual knowledge of any infringement was sufficient to 
find liability. Posner rejects that position, saying it “could result in the 
shutting down of the [distribution] service or its annexation by the 
copyright owners (contrary to the clear import of the Sony 
decision).”387 But Judge Posner is also unwilling to grant open ended 
market entry to Aimster and similar online distribution systems. 
Aimster’s lawyers pressed for an interpretation that would essentially 
mimic the results of Teleprompter: a holding that even potential of 
legitimate uses are enough to create an exemption from copyright. 
This view is also rejected: “It is not enough, as we have said, that a 
product or service be physically capable, as it were, of a noninfringing 
use.”388 
Instead, the Seventh Circuit lays out, in detail, what an online 
content distribution system must do to gain market entry.389 The result 
is slightly reminiscent of technologically specific communications 
regulation. Judge Posner gives five examples of non-infringing uses 
that, with substantial evidence, would make it a legitimate market 
entrant under the Sony rule. His examples range from the obvious to 
the slightly less so, including the distribution of uncopyrighted music 
exchange as well as anonymous sharing of uncopyrighted photographs 
and dirty jokes.390 The upshot is the decision puts the judiciary in the 
role of deciding when the market entry has reached legitimacy. 
As the Supreme Court reconsiders Sony in the context of online 
content distribution, it faces the three policy options described here. It 
can make market entry substantially easier with a broad exemption for 
bold new pirate technologies, and hope that the market or Congress 
will take care of the resultant chaos. It can hark back to the Bell 
System, tighten incumbent control, and trust existing players to 
introduce new technologies in a planned way. Or it can stick with the 
Sony rule and its consequent involvement of the federal judiciary in 
the weighing of the merit of new technological entrants. As the 
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descriptions suggest, none of these options is particularly tidy. Yet the 
history of copyright’s communications policy gives us no reason to 
expect clean solutions to conflicts among rival disseminators. 
What the right answer is to the online distribution problem is hard 
to say. But it is important that the courts be aware that their copyright 
decisions are de facto setting a substantial and growing part of the 
nation’s communications policy. The instinct that what matters in 
copyright is that authors be protected is not incorrect but simply an 
insufficient accounting of the issues presented. For behind authorship 
concerns lies a cycle of incumbent and challenger technologies that 
will never end. The only question is how painful and costly the 
transitions will be. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article has identified and described a dynamic that at once 
underlies much of copyright law and yet is not considered part of 
orthodox copyright theory. That dynamic is copyright’s role in the 
regulation of competing disseminators, and particularly new and 
incumbent industries. 
There is generous evidence of the effects of this dynamic in both 
the history of copyright and the law itself. Some of the strongest 
examples are the compulsory licensing settlements written directly 
into the copyright law. But the question of copyright’s effects on 
competition among disseminators is evident in many of the important 
doctrines of copyright. Concern for the competitive effects of 
copyright underlies the fair use decisions on reverse engineering, some 
of the copyright-contract discussions, and other matters. Today, the 
dominant example is the Sony doctrine, which has been used by courts 
as a gateway between authorship policy and communication policy: to 
decide whether a court faces a problem of market entry, and whether 
it needs to do something about it. 
Many of these effects are not unknown to copyright theorists. The 
principal goal of this paper has been to analytically consolidate these 
scattered doctrines and to understand them as a de facto 
communications policy. The secondary goal is to theorize copyright’s 
effects on competition among disseminators, to understand what 
choices copyright decisions have, and what values the decisions are 
promoting. As copyright law becomes more important, it is essential 
that judges, lawmakers, and academics understand the effects of the 
law on parties other than authors. 
